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NEVER HANGING DEFENDANTS OUT TO
DRY: PRESERVING THE POLICY BEHIND THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN MONEY
LAUNDERING CONSPIRACIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Combating money laundering through legislation cuts the Achilles‘
heel of criminal schemes that profit from it and stops its detrimental
consequences on society from spreading. 1 Money laundering has
become the focus of crime prevention efforts in the United States and
elsewhere due to its effects on criminal activity and legitimate financial
transactions.2 Although money laundering was strictly a matter for
regulatory agencies in the 1970s, in 1983 President Ronald Reagan called
for a commission on organized crime to investigate ―the sources and
amounts of organized crime‘s income, and the uses to which organized
crime puts its income.‖3 Since then, money laundering has become the
subject of legislation, culminating in 1986 with Congress passing the
Money Laundering Control Act (―the MLCA‖).4
The MLCA empowered the government to investigate money
laundering schemes by criminalizing financial transactions that conceal
See GUY STESSENS, MONEY LAUNDERING: A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
MODEL 84–85 (2000) (writing that because money laundering funds criminal schemes,
typically found in organized crime, fighting the techniques used to fund those schemes
directly undermines crime ―by taking away the incentive for [those criminal] activities‖).
2
Id. Stessens provides three reasons why governments combat money laundering: (1)
to prevent criminals from profiting off their activities; (2) to gather paper trails left by highlevel criminals and kingpins in more complicated schemes; (3) to reduce the detrimental
influence that the flow of dirty money obtained from unlawful activities has on the
financial system. Id. at 85–86.
3
Exec. Order No. 12,435, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,723 (July 28, 1983). See HEBA SHAMS, LEGAL
GLOBALIZATION: MONEY LAUNDERING LAW AND OTHER CASES 17–21 (2004) (summarizing
federal legislation in the 1970s imposing record-keeping and reporting requirements for
banks and other financial institutions). Congress first passed the Bank Secrecy Act (―BSA‖)
in 1970 in reaction to increasing criminal exploitation of relaxed financial record-keeping
practices. Id. at 18. The BSA required banks to keep copies of certain financial instruments
involved in a transaction, such as checks, and imposed civil and criminal penalties for
failure to retain designated records. Id. at 18–19. Additionally, the BSA mandated that
banks report domestic transactions that exceed $10,000 in value and international
transactions that exceed $5,000 in value, and that citizens and residents conducting
business within the United States report any existing relationship with foreign financial
institutions. Id. at 19. Shams concluded that the statute was pivotal in the development of
anti-money laundering law because its responses to problems in criminal, fiscal, and
regulatory enforcement formed the basis for the current money laundering regime. Id. at
21.
4
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352(a), 100 Stat. 3207,
3218 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2006)).
1
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the presence of funds that are taken from illegal activities and are used to
fund future illegal activities.5 Congress drafted the MLCA to give
prosecutors broad reach to prosecute activities suspected of concealing
funds used to finance illegal activities. 6 As a result, the government
prosecutes both large international drug cartels and terrorist
organizations and small two-person operations for money laundering. 7
While this widely applicable statute can serve to defeat the money
laundering problem, it potentially overrides other policy interests, such
as barring money laundering prosecutions based on stale evidence. 8 As
the primary statute for such prosecutions, the MLCA depends on other
statutes to bar prosecutions that lack sufficient evidence to allege money
laundering.9 Nevertheless, the complexity of money laundering crimes
implies that prosecutors have an unlimited amount of time to bring an
indictment for conspiracy to launder money. 10
This Note proposes amendments to the MLCA that preserve a
defendant‘s interest in having a conspiracy prosecution based on
evidence proving the existence of a money laundering conspiracy long

Id.
Tracy Tucker Mann, Money Laundering, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 769, 771 (2007).
7
Id. at 772; cf. Ellen Jancko-Baken, When Will the Idling Statute of Limitations Start
Running in RICO Conspiracy Cases?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2167, 2178–79 (1989) (stating that
because Congress did not define organized crime in the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt
Organization (―RICO‖) statutes, there is ongoing debate about whether the statutes apply
to strictly illegal entities or if they also apply to legal entities where RICO conspiracies may
occur). Courts have more often than not read RICO to include illegal and legal entities. Id.
8
See, e.g., United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
397 (2009) (upholding a conviction for money laundering on the grounds that defendant
co-conspirators committed actions after satisfying the objectives of their scheme which
renewed the limitation period permitted by statute).
9
See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (stating that it is an offense to conspire to defraud or commit
an offense against the United States, an allegation included in money laundering
indictments); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (setting out a five-year limitation period for noncapital criminal offenses subject to federal law, including money laundering crimes under
the MLCA); 26 U.S.C. § 6531(5) (2006) (establishing a six-year limitation period for tax
evasion offenses that some money launderers use to conceal funds).
10
See Mann, supra note 6, at 772 (―[The MLCA] also makes the subsequent use of
criminal proceeds in any transaction illegal in perpetuity, extending well beyond the
statute of limitations for the original criminal conduct.‖). A similar dilemma appears in
prosecutions under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Cf. Michael A. Doyle & Michael P. Kenny,
The Statute of Limitations Applicable to Criminal Enforcement of the Sherman Act: Restraint of
Trade or Enjoyment of the Spoils?, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 184 (1986) (discussing how the
Supreme Court has held that an antitrust conspiracy may continue beyond the initial
agreement, but that the Court ―has not clearly ruled when an antitrust conspiracy ends‖).
This demonstrates, Doyle and Kenny state, ―an inherent tension in the law‖ between the
purpose of statutes of limitations to bring finality to an offense and the conspiracy doctrine
―extend[ing] the statute beyond its stated term.‖ Id.
5
6
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after the actual conspiracy to launder money has ended. 11 First, Part II
places this Note in context, introducing the federal money laundering
statute and its relationship to other statutes commonly applied in a
money laundering prosecution including statutes on conspiracy, tax
evasion, and limitations for certain offenses. 12 Second, Part III analyzes
the interaction between the statutes of limitations and the substantive
offenses for money laundering, which create conflict in application that
risks the statute of limitations having no practical enforcement under
some money laundering crimes.13 Finally, Part IV proposes model
amendments to the MLCA, the conspiracy statute, and the statute of
limitations frequently applied in money laundering prosecutions in
order to increase the effectiveness of statutory limitation periods. 14
II. BACKGROUND
Part II explains the relationship between money laundering and the
federal statute of limitations.15 Notably, the MLCA abrogates the
policies underlying the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. 16
See infra Part IV (proposing model amendments to the MLCA and relevant statutes).
See infra Part II.A.1 (providing background on the federal money laundering statute);
infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the federal statute on tax evasion); infra Part II.A.3 (discussing
the federal statute on conspiracy); infra Part II.B.1 (giving an overview of the policy
considerations behind statutes of limitations and judicial rules that influence how and
when limitation periods apply); infra Part II.B.2 (introducing the federal statute of
limitations for non-capital criminal offenses and the federal limitation period for tax
evasion).
13
See infra Part III.A (discussing how the MLCA may expose defendants to the danger
that an act remotely connected to the conspiracy may defeat a claim that the limitation
period expired prior to an indictment); infra Part III.B (elaborating on the divergence from
the Supreme Court‘s strict standard for connecting overt acts and conspiratorial
agreements); infra Part III.C (analyzing how alleging tax evasion is enough to defeat a
limitation period under a loose interpretation of the Supreme Court‘s direct evidence
standard); infra Part III.D (discussing rules favoring limitation periods under certain
circumstances and judicial rules on overt acts as alternative methods for determining the
application of a limitation period).
14
See infra Part IV.A (proposing a model provision that establishes a limitation period
solely for money laundering indictments within the MLCA); infra Part IV.B (recommending
a model amendment to the MLCA that codifies the Supreme Court‘s direct evidence
standard for money laundering prosecutions); infra Part IV.C (creating a model provision
that allows indictments for conspiracy under the MLCA with the purpose of preventing
prosecutions under the federal conspiracy statute and preventing application of the general
statute of limitations).
15
See infra Part II (introducing the crime of money laundering through its applicable
federal statute and its relationship to the federal general statute of limitations, particularly
through the lens of conspiracy and tax evasion as joint offenses in a money laundering
indictment).
16
See infra Part III (discussing how the interactions between the money laundering
statute, the federal statute of limitations, and the federal conspiracy statute have revealed
11
12
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Part II.A discusses the MLCA, Congressional intent for the statute, and
the advantages it gives prosecutors, including the opportunity to pursue
prosecutions for conspiracy and tax evasion. 17 Part II.B examines
policies behind statutes of limitations in general, the judicial approach to
limitations, Congressional adoption of such policies into the federal
limitation period, and the weakening effect on criminal statutes of
limitations caused by treating money laundering as a substantive
crime.18
A. Transactional Money Laundering Under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and § 1957
Congress enacted the MLCA to prevent money laundering because it
is a source of funding for criminal ventures, such as drug trafficking or
terrorism.19 This Section will first discuss the statutes criminalizing
money laundering through financial transactions, focusing on the
meaning of each element of the crime.20 Next, this Section will introduce
the federal tax evasion statute, which comes into play because tax
evasion is a common form of concealing funds in a money laundering
scheme.21 Finally, this Section will cover the federal general conspiracy
statute, its elements, and its relationship to the money laundering
The relationship between these statutes suggests that
statutes.22
Congress intended to allow prosecutors the most amount of freedom
available to prosecute a money laundering scheme. 23
weaknesses in each when prosecutors bring an indictment for a money laundering
conspiracy).
17
See infra Part II.A (discussing the federal money laundering, tax evasion, and
conspiracy statutes).
18
See infra Part II.B (explaining that statutes of limitations are legislative instruments
designed to balance the interests of prosecutors, defendants, and courts, and then
discussing how courts in general use the statutes of limitations to either bar or allow an
action against a defendant before introducing the federal general and tax code statutes of
limitations).
19
See Amos N. Guiora & Brian J. Field, Using and Abusing the Financial Markets: Money
Laundering as the Achilles‟ Heel of Terrorism, 29 U. PA. J. INT‘L L. 59, 63–64 (2007) (describing
government responses to terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime through
implementation of anti-money laundering statutes).
20
See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the federal money laundering statutes, the elements
constituting money laundering, and how interpretation of those elements favors
prosecution of money laundering crimes).
21
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing how money launderers have used tax evasion as a
form of concealment in money laundering schemes, and how the federal tax evasion statute
relates to the money laundering statutes).
22
See infra Part II.A.3 (introducing the federal general conspiracy statute, its elements,
and its relationship to the money laundering statutes).
23
See Peter J. Kacarab, An Indepth Analysis of the New Money Laundering Statutes, 8 AKRON
TAX J. 1, 2 (1991) (―The new money laundering statutes are aimed to hurt the criminal, with
the greatest impact, by hitting the criminal in his pocketbook.‖).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss1/9

Marusarz: Never Hanging Defendants Out to Dry: Preserving the Policy Behin

2010]
1.

Never Hanging Defendants Out to Dry

257

The Money Laundering Control Act

Money laundering is a statutory crime subject to legislative policy. 24
The MLCA criminalizes money laundering and establishes a penalty for
conspiracy to launder funds.25 Section 1956(a)(1) of Title 18 of the United
States Code states that a financial transaction of proceeds originating
from illegal activity constitutes an act of money laundering and is
punishable with a fine, imprisonment, or both.26 The statute separates
SHAMS, supra note 3, at 45. Sophisticated case studies on transactional laundering
schemes and professional launderers guided the policy behind the MLCA. Id. at 49. Its
drafters, however, wrote the law to cover all possible laundering methods because
laundering methods do not conform to clear and unitary definitions. Id. As a result, the
MLCA can apply in cases radically different from the law‘s initial concerns. Id.
25
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (2006). The penalty for conspiring to launder funds is
determined by the act that substantiates the transaction concealing the money. See id.
§ 1956(c) (listing transactions that Congress defined as an activity that can launder illegally
derived funds); id. § 1956(h) (stating that the penalty for conspiracy to launder money
depends on the nature of the transaction). For a congressionally recognized definition of
money laundering, see Business Community‟s Compliance With Federal Money Laundering
Statutes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st
Cong. 142 (1990) (statement of Michael J. Murphy, Senior Deputy Comm‘r, IRS), which
defines money laundering as ―concealment of the existence, nature or illegal source of illicit
funds in such a manner that the funds will appear legitimate if discovered.‖
26
United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F.3d 1267, 1271–72 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that
because money laundering is a specific intent crime, the prosecution must prove that the
defendant specifically intended to defraud and launder proceeds knowing they were
obtained through unlawful activity). The court in Rahseparian found that evidence was
sufficient for a jury to conclude that a defendant specifically intended to defraud when
promising an inflated monetary reward in exchange for mailing to him a registration fee
for a phony contest. Id. Transactional money laundering is defined in relevant part as
follows:
(a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,
conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in
fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity—
(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity; or
(ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section
7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part—
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal
law,
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the
value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater,
or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. For
purposes of this paragraph, a financial transaction shall be considered
to be one involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity if it is
24
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the crime of money laundering into the following four elements:
knowledge, intent, specified unlawful activity, and concealment. 27
The statute‘s legislative history suggests that Congress wanted to
prevent money laundering to reduce funds available for criminal
activities.28
Congress also extended the statute‘s application in
prosecutions to include several white-collar crimes.29 In general, the
scope of money laundering is bound only to financial transactions that
either further criminal activity or attempt to conceal its presence.30

part of a set of parallel or dependent transactions, any one of which
involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, and all of which
are part of a single plan or arrangement.
§ 1956(a)(1).
27
See § 1956(a) (listing the elements of money laundering); Rahseparian, 231 F.3d at 1272
(stating that in order to prove guilt for money laundering under § 1956, the prosecution
must prove ―(1) [the defendant] knowingly conducted a financial transaction; (2) he knew
the funds represented proceeds of an unlawful activity; (3) the funds actually did represent
the proceeds of the unlawful activity; and (4) the transaction was designed to conceal the
nature, location, source ownership or control of the proceeds‖).
28
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money
Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 394
(2003). Cuéllar gives three concerns of legislators underlying the statute against money
laundering:
(1) a recurring preoccupation with the nexus linking high-level figures
in drug trafficking and organized crime to money laundering; (2) a
conclusion that money laundering involved a range of financial
activity, including complex financial schemes, that—if detected—could
point to the presence of predicate crimes (and, more recently, to the
presence of terrorism); and (3) . . . a concern with people thought to be
specialists in money laundering, navigating the criminal underworld
and helping people engage in illicit transactions.
Id. at 396. Statements from the executive branch also affect the interpretation of legislative
intent. Id. The executive‘s interpretation of money laundering includes criminal
organizations and professional laundering, which suggests that ―money laundering is the
‗life blood‘ of crime and the fight against money laundering is about shattering the link
between money and crime.‖ Id.
29
Id. at 401–02 (stating that the scope of unlawful activities in § 1956 has since included
environmental crimes, murder-for-hire, and terrorism). See generally § 1956(c)(7) (providing
a long list of specified unlawful activities that the statute considers predicates for money
laundering, including manufacturing, selling, or distributing controlled substances;
murder, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, arson, and crimes of violence; fraud or attempt to
defraud related to a foreign bank; acts constituting a continuing criminal enterprise as
defined in the Controlled Substances Act; and crimes of violence at airports, espionage,
firearms trafficking, and terrorism).
30
Patricia T. Morgan, Money Laundering, the Internal Revenue Service, and Enforcement
Priorities, 43 FLA. L. REV. 939, 947 (1991). Morgan notes that § 1956, unlike previous
legislation, criminalizes money laundering of monetary instruments, not just currency. Id.
at 948. Thus, the statute makes it significantly easier to prosecute anyone who received
payment of any kind originating in unlawful activity, provided he knew or strongly
suspected of its origin. Id. at 948–49.
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Congress also debated the knowledge requirement and suggested
that certain knowledge is required in transactions that involve illegal
funds.31 Defendants, however, will meet the knowledge requirement
without actual knowledge of an illegal activity if they know that the
proceeds will go toward illegal activity. 32 A defendant only needs to
know that someone else intended to design the transaction. 33
The next element, conducting a financial transaction, comprises
several actions involving banks or disposition of property. 34 To satisfy
this element, the transaction must either (1) move funds or monetary
instruments, or (2) use a financial institution, the result of which affects
interstate or foreign commerce in some way.35 Congress broadly defined
See § 1956(c)(1) (defining the knowledge requirement as ―the person knew the
property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not
necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State, Federal, or foreign
law‖); see also S. REP. NO. 99-433, at 9–10 (1986) (evaluating the need for a knowledge
requirement in the MLCA). With regard to the knowledge requirement, the Senate report
states:
Section 1956(a)(1) . . . employs a scienter standard of ―knowing,‖ rather
than ―reason to know‖ or ―reckless disregard.‖ In fact, it has two
―knowing‖ requirements. In order to prove a violation of the offense,
the Government must show not only that the defendant knew the
property involved in a transaction was the proceeds of crime, but also
that the defendant either intended to facilitate a crime or knew that the
transaction was designed to conceal the proceeds of a crime.
Id. at 9–10. The Senate report adds that willful blindness satisfies the knowledge
requirement. Id.
32
Morgan, supra note 30, at 948. The knowledge requirement is still satisfied ―[i]f the
defendant knew only that the property was derived from unlawful activity, but did not
know the nature of the activity or whether it was one of the specified crimes, and the
activity is a specified crime.‖ Id.
33
See § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) (criminalizing activity with intent to engage in tax fraud and tax
evasion); id. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (criminalizing activity with the intent to conceal or disguise
proceeds of specified unlawful activity); G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of
the „90s, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 149, 162 (1989) (stating that under § 1956(a)(1)(B) a defendant
need only know ―that the transaction is designed in whole or in part,‖ and that the use of
the passive voice means the intent requirement is met when the defendant knew ―the
intent of the person who ‗designed‘ the transaction‖); see also JOHN MADINGER, MONEY
LAUNDERING: A GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORS 40 (2d ed. 2006) (stating that under
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) the government only needs to prove a defendant intended to promote an
activity that he knew was illegal). Evidence for proving intent under either provision may
be either direct or circumstantial. Id. at 41.
34
See § 1956(c)(3) (defining a transaction as a common transaction such as a purchase,
sale, or transfer; or any transaction concerning a bank such as a loan, deposit, or
withdrawal). Similarly, the MLCA defines financial transactions as any transaction
affecting interstate or foreign commerce or using a financial institution that in turn affects
interstate or foreign commerce. Id. § 1956(c)(4).
35
TAX DIV., DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL § 25.02 [4] (2001),
http://www.justice.gov/tax/readingroom/2001ctm/25ctax.htm#25.02[4];
see
also
§ 1956(c)(6) (stating that the definition of financial institution for purposes of the MLCA
31
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who can be involved in a money laundering scheme and the duration of
the crime itself.36
Congress, however, did not clearly define what constitutes proceeds
derived from an unlawful activity in a transaction, which has resulted in
vague interpretations that are advantageous to both prosecutors and
defendants.37 In part, this uncertainty stems from the requirement that
the proceeds emerge from specified unlawful activities that § 1956(c)(7)
lists.38 The Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the meaning of
proceeds, but critics argue that the Court‘s efforts have confused the
meaning even more.39 Furthermore, the statute does not require
prosecutors to trace the proceeds back to a particular illegal act, only that
the proceeds originated from a § 1956(c)(7) activity.40 The proceeds do
not have to be purely illegal or a result of a specified unlawful act. 41
also includes what is provided in 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (2006), which defines financial
institution as any one of twenty-six entities or persons involved in financing).
36
See Kacarab, supra note 23, at 7 (stating that the statute applies to anyone who
participated in a financial transaction and knew that the proceeds of the transaction came
from an illegal activity). In terms of duration, the reference to attempted conduct in the
statute makes this an inchoate crime. Id.
37
Guiora & Field, supra note 19, at 70. Although focusing on the prosecution of
terrorism, the authors suggest that because the statute lacks a definition of proceeds,
litigants can use this flexibility in the statute to their advantage. Id. In addition, the
statute‘s lack of guidance in proving the source of the proceeds gives prosecutors latitude
because they only need to prove that the proceeds trace back to some unlawful activity. Id.
Despite the vagueness of the statute‘s definition of proceeds, courts have held that the
provision remains constitutional because it still puts defendants on notice. See United
States v. Kimball, 711 F. Supp. 1031, 1034–35 (D. Nev. 1989) (stating that the provision in
§ 1956 imposing criminal penalties on avoiding a transaction reporting requirement is not
vague because ―[t]here is nothing in the legislative history [demonstrating] that Congress
intended that the word ‗avoid‘‖ to mean anything other than its common definition);
United States v. Mainieri, 691 F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that individuals
who engage in financial transactions meant to conceal illegally obtained money are put on
notice by the statute‘s wording).
38
See § 1956(c)(7) (listing what constitutes a specified unlawful activity for purposes of a
money laundering prosecution). Interestingly, tax crimes are not included as among
specified unlawful activities. S. REP. NO. 99-433, at 11–12 (1986) (concluding that tax
evasion should not be a specified unlawful activity because it is a nonreporting of proceeds
derived from specified unlawful activities and does not produce identifiable proceeds by
itself).
39
See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 520 (2008) (holding that proceeds under
§ 1956 only means funds derived from a specified unlawful activity, not funds derived
from the commission of such activity). See generally Jimmy Gurulé, Does “Proceeds” Really
Mean “Net Profits”? The Supreme Court‟s Efforts to Diminish the Utility of the Federal Money
Laundering Statute, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 339, 339–43 (2008) (commenting on the Supreme
Court‘s recent decision regarding the definition of proceeds and objecting to the decision as
diminishing the effect of the MLCA while appealing to Congress to clarify the meaning of
proceeds in the statute).
40
United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1990). In Blackman, the
government introduced evidence that the defendant funded his narcotics trafficking
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Section 1956(a)(1)(B) implies that a successful conviction for money
laundering turns on the concealment of proceeds of the unlawful
activity.42 While courts have interpreted concealment to encompass all
transactions designed to launder proceeds from specified unlawful
activity, courts have also stated that only unlawful activities specified in
§ 1956(c)(7) constitute acts of concealment.43
Sufficient proof of
scheme through a money wiring service and by transferring title on his truck. Id. at 1253–
54. The defendant appealed, arguing that a reasonable juror would not find that the
government‘s evidence proved the money wiring and transfer of title on his truck
contained proceeds from drug trafficking. Id. at 1256. The defendant contended that the
transfer of title was not a financial transaction and that the MLCA requires the government
to trace the proceeds involved in the transaction to a particular drug sale. Id. at 1256–57.
The court concluded that the transfer of title fit within the definition of financial transaction
because it involved a monetary instrument. Id. at 1257; see also S. REP. NO. 99-433, at 12–13
(stating that § 1956(c)(3) defines financial transaction broadly). The court also concluded
that the government met its burden of proof by showing that the defendant wired money
as a way to launder money for his drug trafficking scheme. Blackman, 904 F.2d at 1257. The
court reasoned that § 1956 did not require direct evidence to prove the proceeds element.
Id. The court further reasoned that the government can prove that transactions involve
proceeds from drug trafficking through circumstantial evidence so long as the evidence is
sufficient. Id.
41
See United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 40 (7th Cir. 1991) (―[W]e cannot believe that
Congress intended that participants in unlawful activities could prevent their own
convictions under the money laundering statute simply by commingling funds derived
from both ‗specified unlawful activities‘ and other activities.‖). The court of appeals added
that ―commingling [of funds] is itself suggestive of a design to hide the source of ill-gotten
gains.‖ Id.
42
§ 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i). For examples of intent to conceal assets gained from unlawful
activity, see United States v. Hunt, 272 F.3d 488, 496 (7th Cir. 2001), using a third party to
disguise the real owner of the assets; United States v. Omoruyi 260 F.3d 291, 297 (3d Cir.
2001), using a false name for a bank account to deposit and withdraw proceeds from to
disguise the identity of the real owner; United States v. Farese, 248 F.3d 1056, 1060 (11th Cir.
2001), structuring cash transactions to disguise the nature of the illegal funds; United States
v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 2000), using property registered or titled to a third
party with whom the defendant has a close relationship; United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d
740, 748 (6th Cir. 2000), using convoluted transactions transferring proceeds to a third party
who converted the money to cash and transferred the proceeds back to the defendant; and
Jackson, 935 F.2d at 841, commingling funds obtained through illegal activity into the bank
account of a legitimate business. For other examples of evidence, see also United States v.
Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1176 (11th Cir. 2005), suggesting intent to conceal assets through
unusual secrecy during the transaction; United States v. Bolden, 325 F.3d 471, 490 (4th Cir.
2003), setting up a sham or fictitious business to store assets; and United States v. Esterman,
324 F.3d 565, 573 (7th Cir. 2003), making statements from defendants or making unusual
financial moves demonstrate an intent to conceal. Expert testimony may also expose
concealment of illegal proceeds by providing insight into criminal practices. Magluta, 418
F.3d at 1176.
43
See United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2006) (―It is true that the money
laundering statute does not criminalize the mere spending or investing of illegally obtained
assets.‖); United States v. Shepard, 396 F.3d 1116, 1120 (10th Cir. 2005) (―[W]e construe the
money laundering statute as a ‗concealment statute—not a spending statute.‘‖). The
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concealment must include substantial evidence of a design to conceal
rather than merely suspicious acts by defendants. 44 The simplicity of the
alleged scheme will likely not support a conclusion that a defendant
attempted to conceal assets of illegal activities.45
Section 1957, on the other hand, is the companion to § 1956 and
criminalizes engaging in a money transaction involving property worth
over $10,000 received from a specified unlawful activity. 46 Congress
enacted § 1957 and recognized that non-financial transactions, such as
commercial transactions, can conceal assets. 47 Although this statute
Shepard court stated that a transaction of illegally obtained money alone does not constitute
concealment. See id. (―We reject an interpretation of the money laundering statute ‗to
broadly encompass all transactions, however ordinary on their face, which involve the
proceeds of unlawful activity.‘‖). The court justified its reasoning on the expressed
language of the money laundering statute, which required actions intending concealment.
Id.; see also § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (containing language courts have interpreted as limiting the
scope of concealment).
44
Shepard, 396 F.3d at 1121. The defendant in Shepard attempted to disguise funds from
an unlawful activity by depositing them in his daughter‘s bank account and the bank
account of a kennel club. Id. at 1118. The court in Shepard found that depositing assets into
a third party‘s bank account was concealment because the defendant attempted to
commingle the unlawfully obtained money with the money from the legitimate business or
legitimate owner of the account. Id. at 1122.
45
Esterman, 324 F.3d at 572. The court in Esterman observed that concealment in a
money laundering scheme included ―the existence of more than one transaction, coupled
with either direct evidence of intent to conceal or sufficiently complex transactions that
such an intent could be inferred.‖ Id. at 572. ―In contrast, the cases in which money
laundering charges have not succeeded are typically simple transactions that can be
followed with relative ease, or transactions that involve nothing but the initial crime.‖ Id.
46
18 U.S.C. § 1957. The relevant section provides in part:
(a) Whoever, in any of the circumstances set forth in subsection (d),
knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in
criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is
derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b).
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the punishment for an
offense under this section is a fine under title 18, United States Code,
or imprisonment for not more than ten years or both.
(2) The court may impose an alternate fine to that imposable under
paragraph (1) of not more than twice the amount of the criminally
derived property involved in the transaction.
(c) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, the Government
is not required to prove the defendant knew that the offense from
which the criminally derived property was derived was specified
unlawful activity.
Id.
47
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-855, at 15 (1986) (―This branch of the offense has been created in
recognition that money laundering schemes need not involve financial institutions and
that, in fact, non-financial transactions are extensively used as parts of money laundering
schemes.‖).
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relates to § 1956, it bears some differences, namely the absence of a
―knowledge of specified unlawful activity‖ requirement.48
The
legislative record suggests, however, that § 1957 should be read broadly
to allow the prosecution of commercial acts. 49 The language of § 1956
and § 1957, therefore, gives prosecutors freedom to prosecute anyone
associated with a money laundering scheme in order to effectuate
Congress‘s intent to prevent such a scheme altogether. 50
2.

Tax Evasion as a Form of Concealment

Congress later drafted provisions into the MLCA that allow
prosecutions under other criminal statutes for acts that allegedly
concealed funds, such as tax evasion.51 Money launderers have been
known to use tax evasion as an effective tactic to conceal funds received
from illegal activity because there are no identifiable proceeds. 52
Compare § 1957(a) (stating that a defendant must know he is involved in a transaction
but not that the transaction involves criminally derived property), with id. § 1956(a) (stating
that a defendant must know the transaction involved funds representing proceeds from
unlawful activity). It is unclear whether § 1957 requires the prosecutor to trace the funds if
they commingle with legitimate funds. Mann, supra note 6, at 780–81.
49
§ 1957(d) (providing that a transaction done within the maritime or territorial
jurisdiction of the United States or outside the jurisdiction of the United States and by a
United States citizen is subject to prosecution); Mann, supra note 6, at 775 (―Congress
intended to dissuade people from engaging in even ordinary commercial transactions with
people suspected to be involved in criminal activity.‖). Representative Dan Lungren made
a statement regarding the necessity for a broad knowledge requirement: ―It is time for us
to tell the local trafficker and everyone else, ‗If you know that person is a trafficker and has
this income derived from the offense, you better beware of dealing with that person.‘‖
H.R. REP. NO. 99-855, at 14 (1986).
50
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-855, at 14 (statement of Sen. Bill McCollum) (stating that if a
grocer observed a potential customer peddling drugs and taking cash before walking into
the store, the grocer should be held accountable if he accepted the cash from the trafficker
in exchange for groceries).
51
See § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (including as criminal conduct a transaction of proceeds
of specified unlawful activity with intent to violate the tax evasion statute in the Internal
Revenue Code); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7206 (2006) (criminalizing attempts to evade tax or make
false statements on a tax return).
52
See Kacarab, supra note 23, at 22–23. Kacarab states that § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) was
amended to prevent money launderers from using a loophole in the definition of proceeds
in the MLCA:
The loophole was that § 1956 prohibited transactions which were
designed to conceal the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity.
However, proof of intent to conceal the underlying specified unlawful
activity is essential to obtain a conviction under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The
big problem is that even if the drug dealer actually did intend to
conceal his illicit source of income, proof of such intent may be
impossible to obtain. Keep in mind that § 1956 as originally enacted
required the government, at a minimum, to prove a defendant‘s
48
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Congress‘s response to this method of concealment was the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, which allowed prosecution of § 1956 money
laundering with tax evasion under § 7201 and § 7206 of the Internal
Revenue Code.53
Section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code, also known as Title 26 of
the United States Code, makes it a felony to willfully evade or attempt to
willfully evade or fail to pay a federal tax.54 Section 7206 of the Internal
knowledge that funds represent the ―proceeds of some form of
unlawful activity.‖ However, tax crimes, such as tax evasion (26
U.S.C. § 7201) or filing of a false return (26 U.S.C. § 7206), unlike other
crimes, have no identifiable ―proceeds.‖ Therefore, the government is
unable to use the originally enacted § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) to prosecute
individuals who launder illegal proceeds for the purpose of tax
evasion.
Id. (footnote omitted). In addition, tax evasion is not considered a specified unlawful
activity because the MLCA only covers unlawfully obtained money, which by its nature is
non-taxable. MADINGER, supra note 33, at 41.
53
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6471, 102 Stat. 4181, 4378 (1988).
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act modified the MLCA, making it a crime to commit or attempt to
commit a financial transaction of illegal funds by way of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201
or making a false tax return under 26 U.S.C. § 7206. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii)
(making it a crime to commit acts in violation of the tax evasion or false tax return statutes
under the Internal Revenue Code). Senator Joseph Biden noted the necessity of modifying
the contemporaneous statute to include tax crimes as a form of money laundering activity,
stating that under the amendment, ―any person who conducts a financial transaction that
in whole or in part involves property derived from unlawful activity, intending to engage
in conduct that constitutes a violation of the tax laws, would be guilty of a money
laundering offense.‖
134 CONG. REC. 32,699 (1988).
Because the nature of
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) involves a tax crime, prosecutors must seek authorization from the Tax
Division of the Justice Department in order to indict. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS‘
MANUAL
§ 9-105.750
(1997),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/105mcrm.htm.
Such authorization is required when an indictment involves a tax-fraud conspiracy or
when intent to commit tax evasion or filing false returns is the sole purpose of the financial
transaction. Id. Authorization from the tax division is not always required, however, as
the U.S. Attorney‘s Manual submits three conditions where this is not necessary to proceed
on a money laundering indictment:
It is assumed in situations where Tax Division authorization is not
requested that: (1) the principal purpose of the financial transaction
was to accomplish some other covered purpose, such as carrying on
some specified unlawful activity like drug trafficking; (2) the
circumstances do not warrant the filing of substantive tax or tax fraud
conspiracy charges; and (3) the existence of a secondary tax evasion or
false return motivation for the transaction is one that is readily
apparent from the nature of the money laundering transaction itself.
Id.
54
26 U.S.C. § 7201. The statute states:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition
to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon
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Revenue Code acts as a corollary to the tax evasion statute and defines
tax evasion as withholding, falsifying, or destroying records. 55
Moreover, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow prosecutors to
join tax evasion with non-tax related offenses under certain guidelines.56
Under the amended § 1956, prosecutors may find a violation if a
defendant made a financial transaction with intent to engage in tax
evasion or false filing of tax returns.57 Defendants may use tax evasion
as part of a complex money laundering scheme that, due to its

conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in
the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both, together with the costs of prosecution.
Id.
Id. § 7206(5)(B). The section states:
Any person who—
....
(5) [i]n connection with any compromise under section 7122, or offer
of such compromise, or in connection with any closing agreement
under section 7121, or offer to enter into any such agreement,
willfully—
....
(B) [r]eceives, withholds, destroys, mutilates, or falsifies any
book, document, or record, or makes any false statement,
relating to the estate or financial condition of the taxpayer or
other person liable in respect of the tax;
shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or
imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of
prosecution.
Id. (statutory numbering system omitted).
56
FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a). Rule 8(a), concerning joinder of offenses, provides that:
The indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate
counts with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged—whether
felonies or misdemeanors or both—are of the same or similar
character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected
with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.
Id.
57
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii); TAX DIV., U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL
§ 25.03[2] (2008) [hereinafter 2008 CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL], http://www.justice.gov/tax/
readingroom/2008ctm/CTM%20Chapter%2025.htm. The manual states that the statute, at
the very least, requires only the act and intent to constitute a violation. Id. Furthermore,
§ 1956 applies to evasion of income, gift, excise, estate, or any other tax. Id. § 25.03[2][a].
Section 7201 does not require that a defendant successfully evade tax obligations, only that
tax evasion was willfully attempted. Cf. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 49899 (1943)
(stating that including an attempt element in the contemporary tax evasion statute
indicated that Congress wanted to distinguish between neglectful and motivated failure to
pay taxes). Thus, there is also an imposed knowledge requirement. Cheek v. United
States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991) (holding that the prosecutor must prove that the defendant
knew the transaction was for the purpose of circumventing tax obligations).
55
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sophistication, would involve multiple persons conspiring to commit
money laundering.58
3.

Conspiracy

Similarly, conspiracy crimes frequently occur in money laundering
schemes because their complicated nature requires multiple participants
and gives prosecutors discretion on how to prosecute. 59 This section
explains the federal criminal conspiracy statute (―§ 371‖), the MLCA
provision for conspiracy (―§ 1956(h)‖), the four elements of conspiracy,
and conspiracy‘s relationship to money laundering schemes. 60
Conspiracy under § 371 is a conspiracy to commit an offense against or
defraud the United States and is charged as a separate offense from the
substantive crime that the conspirators contemplated.61 Section 1956(h)
58
See COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST
FINANCING: A MODEL OF BEST PRACTICE FOR THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, THE PROFESSIONS AND
OTHER DESIGNATED BUSINESSES 65 (2d ed. 2006) (stating that defendants may use tax
evasion ―as a smokescreen for their unusual or abnormal transactions or instructions‖); see
also § 6471, 102 Stat. at 4378 (modifying the MLCA to include tax evasion as money
laundering activity); Kacarab, supra note 23, at 22 (stating that Congress intended the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988 to bring in third party money launderers under the scope of the
MLCA). The MLCA does not specifically criminalize tax evasion included in money
laundering, only the transactions involved in evading taxes. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii);
Mann, supra note 6, at 774 n.35.
59
J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 31 (2d ed. 2006) (stating that
the complexity of white-collar crimes, which often involve multiple actors, allows the
government to add a conspiracy charge). Strader gives three reasons that account for the
frequent charging of conspiracy in white-collar crimes:
First, as is often true with crimes charged in the white collar context,
the boundaries of conspiracy are inherently uncertain . . . . Second,
because of this vagueness and expansiveness, the government can
often use conspiracy both to criminalize conduct that otherwise would
not be subject to prosecution and to gain increased penalties for minor
crimes. Finally, given the amorphous nature of the crime, it provides
prosecutors with an enormous amount of discretion in deciding when,
and when not, to bring a criminal case. For these reasons, and because
of the tremendous strategic and tactical advantages it provides the
government, conspiracy is a controversial crime.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The MLCA contains its own provision for indicting money
laundering conspiracies, imposing the same penalty for conspiracy as on the substantive
offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).
60
See infra Part II.A.3 (introducing the federal criminal conspiracy statute and its
relationship to the MLCA and the MLCA conspiracy provision).
61
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006). This section provides in part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against
the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more the such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
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does not consider conspiracy to be an offense separate from money
laundering and sets the penalty for conspiracy to commit a money
laundering offense.62 Two clauses in § 371, the fraud and offense clauses,
provide justification for charging a defendant with conspiracy. 63 The
statute defines an offense against the United States as a violation of a
statute.64 Similarly, it defines fraud as preventing a lawful function of
government and does not require an injury to the government as a result
of the fraudulent act.65 The elements for conspiracy under both § 371
Id.; see also Christian Davis & Eric Waters, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
523, 523–24 (2007). Davis and Waters state that criminal statutes may have their own
conspiracy provisions, but that this does not preclude prosecutors from attaching an
indictment under the general conspiracy statute. Id. at 524-25. Section 371 makes an
exception for the maximum punishment for conspiracy if the underlying offense is a
misdemeanor. 18 U.S.C. § 371. If the underlying offense is a misdemeanor, the
punishment for conspiracy will not exceed the maximum punishment for the offense. Id.
Section 371 is a modern version of the original federal conspiracy act that Congress passed
in 1866, making it illegal for government distillery inspectors to conspire with distillery
owners to avoid paying taxes. Terry D. Aronoff, Acts of Concealment and the Continuation of
a Conspiracy, 17 GA. L. REV. 539, 539–40 (1983); see also Law of May 17, 1879, ch. 5440, 21
Stat. 4 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006)) (criminalizing a conspiracy of two or more
persons to defraud or commit an offense against the United States, including any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy). Although Congress has since expanded the scope of the
conspiracy statute, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to view conspiracy too broadly.
Aronoff, supra note 61, at 540; see also, e.g., Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404
(1957) (―[W]e will view with disfavor attempts to broaden the already pervasive and widesweeping nets of conspiracy prosecutions.‖).
62
18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (―Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this
section or section 1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the
offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.‖).
63
Id. § 371 (stating that a defendant can be charged with conspiracy only when he
conspired with one or more other persons to commit any offense against the United States
or to defraud the United States).
64
Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Galardi, 476 F.2d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding
conviction of defendants for conspiracy to violate a federal criminal statute). In Galardi, a
defendant was charged with conspiracy, under § 371, to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which
prohibited transporting stolen money orders in foreign commerce. Id. at 1074; see also 18
U.S.C. § 2314 (imposing fines or imprisonment for transport of stolen goods, money, or
securities in foreign or interstate commerce). The court rejected the government‘s charge of
conspiracy to commit that violation. Galardi, 476 F.2d at 1079. The court reasoned that
because the statute did not apply to money orders altered before the defendant transported
them, and the defendant succeeded in proving they altered the money orders before they
transported them, they did not commit a violation of that statute. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314 (―This section shall not apply to any falsely made, forged, altered, counterfeited or
spurious representation of an obligation or other security of the United States.‖). Thus, the
court held that there was no offense for which the prosecutors could charge the defendant
with conspiracy. Galardi, 476 F.2d at 1079.
65
United States v. Notch, 939 F.2d 895, 901 (10th Cir. 1991) (defining fraud as keeping
the government from performing a lawful function). In Notch, the defendant argued that a
charge of conspiracy was in error because the prosecution based its charge on the fraud
clause of § 371. Id. at 900. The defendant asserted that the offense clause of § 371 was a
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and § 1956(h) consist of agreement, intent to complete the offense
conspired, and knowledge that the conspiracy existed; however, only
§ 371 requires commission of overt acts. 66 Like the MLCA, the general
conspiracy statute is given a broad interpretation for each element. 67
Courts have been reluctant to consider conspiracies with specific
objectives to be outside the scope of § 371.68 Conspiracy charges joined
more appropriate justification for the conspiracy charge because he committed an offense
against the United States by failing to file an accurate tax return. Id. The court held that
filing a false tax return was fraud, reasoning that it concealed taxable income and
prevented the IRS from performing an accurate collection. Id. at 901; see also Outlaw v.
United States, 81 F.2d 805, 807 (5th Cir. 1936) (defining the phrase ―defraud the United
States‖ as an attempt to defeat a lawful function of government); Coluccio v. United States,
313 F. Supp. 2d 150, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that § 371 covers any act that may interfere
or obstruct lawful government functions by deceit, craft, trickery, or otherwise dishonest
means).
66
See Davis & Waters, supra note 61, at 526–35 (discussing at length the four elements of
conspiracy). A conspiracy first exists when two or more co-conspirators make an original
agreement to commit an offense and then work collectively toward completing the offense.
Id. at 526. The offense must include the illegal goal of defrauding or offending the United
States. Id. at 529–30. Prosecutors must also prove that the co-conspirators knew they were
voluntarily working toward a conspiracy. Id. at 531–32. The last requirement is that the coconspirators made overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy. Id. at 534. But compare 18
U.S.C. § 371 (requiring an overt act), with 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (not requiring an overt act);
Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 216 (2005) (stating that § 1956(h) creates a new
offense and therefore does not need to have the same elements as § 371, including an overt
act requirement). On the other hand, the Department of Justice recommended that an overt
act be included in § 1956(h) and that conspiracies for money laundering be indicted under
this statute rather than § 371. MADINGER, supra note 33, at 47. There is no language in
either statute, however, that provides for exclusion. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1956(h); Davis &
Waters, supra note 61, at 524–25 (explaining that prosecutors may indict a number of
offenses under § 371 even when statutes defining the offenses contain their own conspiracy
provisions).
67
Davis & Waters, supra note 61, at 526–35. A conspiracy charge, for example, does not
require formal agreement and can be found through circumstantial evidence. Id. at 527.
The illegal goal element may be met without co-conspirators knowing they were violating
a specific federal statute constituting an offense or a broader fraudulent act against the
United States. Id. at 531. Additionally, the knowledge element is lax, only requiring some
knowledge of the conspiracy and its details or an act that advanced the conspiracy‘s
objectives. Id. at 532–33. Alternatively, some courts require a slight connection or
foreseeability of defendants‘ action toward the conspiracy. Id. at 533; see, e.g., United States
v. Collazo-Aponte, 216 F.3d 163, 196–97 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Comeaux, 955 F.2d
586, 591 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1991). Lastly,
an overt act can be any act, lawful or not, if it advances the conspiracy. Davis & Waters,
supra note 61, at 534. A defendant may be liable for any offense another co-conspirator
committed if the offense was in furtherance of or was a foreseeable result of the conspiracy.
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645–48 (1946).
68
Cf. Doyle & Kenny, supra note 10, at 193–201 (discussing federal circuit court cases
that questioned whether antitrust prosecutions should be distinguished from conspiracies
in general). Compare United States v. A-A-A Elec. Co., 788 F.2d 242, 245 (4th Cir. 1986)
(holding that an antitrust conspiracy for collusive bidding is no different than a conspiracy
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with tax evasion charges are common because tax evasion prevents the
IRS from assessing and collecting taxes owed to the government. 69
Section 371 requires application of the limitation period of a joined
offense rather than directly providing a limitation period on a conspiracy
charge and excludes its application to more specific conspiracy
provisions.70 Because the Internal Revenue Code does not have a
conspiracy statute, prosecutors justify a tax-related conspiracy under §

under § 371 and continues until all objectives of the conspiracy had been achieved), with
United States v. Inyrco, 642 F.2d 290, 294–95 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a bid-rigging
conspiracy retained the character of an antitrust conspiracy after the defendants completed
their specific objectives because they enjoyed the benefits of restrained trade). Under § 371,
a conspiracy to restrain trade would continue until the last overt act. Doyle & Kenny, supra
note 10, at 192–93. This includes unjust enrichment as a result of the conspiracy, which
Doyle and Kenny suggest, indefinitely extends the conspiracy. Id. at 192. In contrast, the
statute of limitations under the Sherman Act commences when the conspirators succeed in
their objectives or abandon the conspiracy altogether. Id. Doyle and Kenny contend that
distinguishing an antitrust conspiracy from a conspiracy in general is appropriate because
the goal in antitrust conspiracies is not to enrich the conspirators, but to restrain trade. Id.
at 204; see also United States v. Kissell, 218 U.S. 601, 607 (1910) (noting the difference
between conspiracies where ―mere continuance of the result of a crime does not continue
the crime‖ and a conspiracy that has ―a continuous result that will not continue without the
continuous co-operation of the conspirators to keep it up‖). This distinction would also
give effect to the statute of limitations in the Sherman Act. Kissell, 218 U.S. at 205. But cf.
Jancko-Baken, supra note 7, at 2190 (arguing that the lack of an overt act requirement in
RICO prosecutions should not distinguish RICO conspiracies from traditional
conspiracies). According to Jancko-Baken, RICO conspiracies that occur in a business
context group defendants together as part of one enterprise, illegal or not. Id. at 2189. The
focus on the enterprise puts defendants long inactive in the conspiracy at risk of having no
effective time bar to a RICO prosecution. Id. Under a traditional conspiracy analysis, the
focus is on whether the objectives of the conspiracy have been met or the time at which a
defendant‘s participation ends. Id. at 2190. To move away from considering the whole
enterprise in RICO conspiracy prosecutions, Jancko-Baken contends, would protect
conspirators that have ended their involvement in the conspiracy. Id. Jancko-Baken claims
this proposal would treat each defendant‘s assertion that the indictment is barred by the
statute of limitations separately, just as the general conspiracy statute would. Id.
69
See David Gomez & Keith Schomig, Tax Violations, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1025, 1064
(2007) (averring that conspiracies to commit tax violations are justified under the defraud
clause in § 371); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a) (permitting joinder of offenses occurring within the
same act or transaction to be presented against a defendant at a single trial).
70
18 U.S.C. § 371; United States v. Lowder, 492 F.2d 953, 956 (4th Cir. 1974). The court in
Lowder stated that:
[t]he general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, contains no period of
limitations. Limitations, for indictments under § 371, are those applied
by other provisions of law, or where there are none, by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3282 which is a general statute of limitations applicable ―[e]xcept as
otherwise expressly provided by law.‖
Lowder, 492 F.2d at 956. In addition, § 371 does not explicitly preclude its own application
when another substantive statute allows for prosecution for conspiracy to commit that
substantive act. 18 U.S.C. § 371.
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371.71 This raises the question of whether tax evasion satisfies the
concealment element of money laundering, which the Supreme Court
addressed in Grunewald v. United States.72 In Grunewald, the Court ruled
that acts committed after the goals of the conspiracy were completed
cannot further the conspiracy without direct evidence that the
conspirators agreed to those acts at the time they originally conspired
2008 CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL, supra note 57, § 23.02, available at
http://www.justice.gov/tax/readingroom/2008ctm/CTM%20Chapter%2023.htm#TOC1_
2. Elsewhere, the Internal Revenue Code allows for conspiracy to defraud the United
States, but only officers and employees of the United States acting under the revenue laws
are subject to prosecution. 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(4) (2006).
72
See Aronoff, supra note 61, at 540 (noting the apparent problem in conspiracy law of
prosecutors using acts of concealment as evidence of overt acts in furtherance of a
conspiracy). Aronoff states that the statutory definition of concealment is ambiguous and
challenging for courts to define, which gives prosecutors deference in proving an act
continued the conspiracy. See id. at 541–42 (footnote omitted) (―A sympathetic Supreme
Court has held that the prosecution may therefore rely on inferences drawn from an
alleged conspirator‘s course of conduct to prove the scope of the alleged unlawful
agreement.‖). In Grunewald v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
alleged acts of concealment after a conspiracy. 353 U.S. 391, 394 (1957); see also United
States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 112–13 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), rev‟d sub nom. United States v.
Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960) (stating that violation of an anti-concealment statute
constitutes concealment of a conspiracy, which the Second Circuit rejected on appeal). The
Second Circuit in Bufalino reaffirmed the direct evidence standard in Grunewald and
rejected the Bonanno court‘s reasoning that violation of a statute is evidence of an original
agreement to conceal. Bufalino, 285 F.2d at 416. The court stated that even if there was
proof of an original agreement to conceal, the government has a burden to prove intent to
conceal by those acts. Id. The Bufalino court then concluded that the government failed to
meet its burden of proving that the defendants agreed to commit perjury and obstruction
of justice in a formal investigation. Id. Because the alleged acts were not done during a
formal investigation, the court found there was no direct evidence of an overt act to
continue a conspiracy. Id.; see also United States. v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 1980)
(forbidding prosecution from implying a direct connection between an act of concealment
and the original agreement by circumstantial evidence); United States v. Franzese, 392 F.2d
954, 964 (2d Cir. 1968) (concluding that an agreement between conspirators to furnish bail
and counsel before committing bank robberies constituted direct evidence of concealment
connected to the original agreement); Green v. U.S. Prob. Office, 504 F. Supp. 1003, 1005-06
(N.D. Cal. 1980), rev‟d, 671 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that completion of a conspiracy
precludes finding that subsequent acts of concealment are in furtherance of a conspiracy).
But see United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 13 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 397 (2009)
(distinguishing Grunewald on the grounds that an act of concealment was a necessary part
of a money laundering scheme; therefore, failing to file taxes after completion of a money
laundering scheme was an act in furtherance of that scheme); United States v. Mackey, 571
F.2d 376, 383–84 (7th Cir. 1978) (allowing a jury to decide based on inferences whether an
act of tax evasion was connected with the original agreement to conspire); United States v.
Nowak, 448 F.2d 134, 139 (7th Cir. 1971) (allowing a jury to infer that defendants intended
to conceal misapplication of loans from the federal government because the defendants
allegedly violated an anti-concealment statute); United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127, 141
(7th Cir. 1966) (extending Grunewald‘s standard to require only ample evidence indicating a
connection to an original agreement).
71
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together.73 Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that a conspiracy must end at
some point in time.74 Following Grunewald, circuit court rulings, such as
the Seventh Circuit‘s decision in United States v. Hickey that required
ample evidence of an agreement on the use of tax evasion as
concealment, further muddled the issue.75 A recent First Circuit
decision, United States v. Upton, diminished the Grunewald standard and
held that direct evidence is not required to show that tax evasion was an
act in furtherance of a money laundering scheme. 76 Such rulings, like
Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 414–15. The defendants in Grunewald conspired to commit tax
evasion through the use of one of the defendants, a lawyer who obtained no prosecution
rulings in favor of some defendants who were suspected of evading their taxes. Id. at 395.
In return for obtaining these rulings the lawyer-defendant was paid, the reporting of which
was then covered up. Id. at 395–96. Further investigation by the IRS eventually made the
taxpayer-defendants reveal the conspiracy in which they were involved, leading to
subsequent prosecution. Id. The defendants appealed, arguing their prosecution occurred
after the limitation period in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 had expired. Id. The Court found in favor of
the defendants. Id. at 415. The lawyer-defendant‘s act of concealing the reports per an
agreement, the Court reasoned, could not be deemed a part of the original conspiracy of tax
evasion. Id. at 404 (following Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 444 (1949), which
rejected the government‘s argument that the statement implied a conspiracy to conceal for
lack of an express agreement to conceal and held that an out-of-court statement made by a
co-conspirator regarding a conspiracy was not in furtherance of the conspiracy). Thus, the
Court permitted the defendants to have a new trial because their current convictions for
conspiracy would have rested on impermissible grounds. Id. at 424.
74
Id. at 404–05 (stating that policy concerns about extending the scope of a conspiracy
beyond Congress‘s imposed limitation period requires that not all acts of concealment
constitute furtherance of a conspiracy).
75
Hickey, 360 F.2d at 141. The defendants in Hickey appealed a conviction for conspiracy
to defraud a savings and loan association. Id. at 130. One of the appeals concerned the
government‘s admission of post-conspiracy evidence, which the defendants contended was
inadmissible because the conspiracy had already ended. Id. at 140. The court accepted the
defendants‘ argument that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Grunewald controlled, but
stated that the evidence was still admissible. Id. at 141. The court reasoned that by
disguising the fraudulent nature of the loans and their borrowers, the defendants‘ acts
constituted a conspiratorial design. Id. Additionally, acts after the completion of the
defendants‘ objectives, including altering trusts and stifling a third-party who signed off on
the loans, supplied ample evidence that the acts of concealment were part of the original
conspiratorial design. Id.
76
See Upton, 559 F.3d at 13. In Upton, the defendant used admittedly stolen money to
partly purchase property. Id. at 6. In 1997, he then paid the remaining balance with a
series of cashier‘s checks to various banks or the same bank several times, after which an
accomplice took title by way of a trust. Id. at 6–7. The defendant and his accomplice then
used this property to take out sham mortgages and in 1999 sold the property for a greater
amount than purchased. Id. at 7. The defendant filed his tax return for 1997 in 2000,
omitting the stolen money from his reported income. Id. Subsequent tax returns from him
or his accomplice were either false or not filed. Id. In 2004, following an indictment for
money laundering and an additional indictment for money laundering and tax evasion, a
jury found the defendant guilty. Id. at 8. The district court did not allow a jury instruction
on the limitation period because the defendant had not raised it as a defense at the charge
conference. Id. at 7–8. The defendant appealed, claiming the statute of limitations barred
73

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2010], Art. 9

272

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

Upton and Hickey, have implications for statutes of limitations, which
will be introduced in the next Section. 77
B. Federal Statutes of Limitations
This Section will discuss statutes of limitations and their relationship
to the crime of money laundering. 78 First, this Section will explain the
legislative policy behind statutes of limitations in state and federal law
and their general characteristics.79 Next, this Section will discuss the
the charge of conspiracy to launder money. Id. at 8. The First Circuit rejected the
defendant‘s argument that Grunewald applied. Id. at 13. The defendant raised four points,
all of which the court rejected in upholding the indictment. Id. First, the concealment
provision in § 1956 required the prosecution to prove that the defendant designed the act to
conceal the proceeds, which is a jury question and one the jury could have reasonably
found. Id. at 11–12; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006) (statutory numbering system
omitted) (including a requirement that the defendant know that the transaction was
―designed in whole or in part—to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source,
the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity‖). Next, the
court responded to the defendant‘s argument that Grunewald limited the scope of defining
an act of concealment up to the point when the anticipated economic benefits were
realized. Upton, 559 F.3d at 13. The court rejected this argument, stating that the jury could
have reasonably found that the evasion of taxes furthered the main objective of the
defendant‘s money laundering scheme. Id. at 13–14. Third, the court rejected the
defendant‘s claim that there was no expressed original agreement to satisfy Grunewald
because the First Circuit required only that the act of concealment had to be foreseeable to
one co-conspirator. Id. at 14. Finally, the defendant‘s argument that his estrangement from
his co-conspirators amounted to a withdrawal from the conspiracy held little weight
because the defendant waived this defense by not affirmatively ending the conspiracy. Id.
at 15. The First Circuit in Upton stated as an aside that concealment in a money laundering
scheme prevents authorities from discovering the illegal nature of the proceeds and is as
important as repainting a car in a conspiracy of grand theft auto. Id. at 13 n.9; see United
States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, 859 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that concealment of financial
transactions by tax evasion was central to the conspiracy to make fraudulent transactions,
thus the holding in Grunewald and in subsequent cases would not support finding the
conspiracy finished before the acts of alleged concealment); United States v. Goldberg, 105
F.3d 770, 774–75 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding that defendant filing false tax returns, without
evidence that co-conspirators agreed to this, constituted an act in furtherance of a
conspiracy because it enabled the co-conspirators to interfere with the IRS); United States v.
Esacove, 943 F.2d 3, 5 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that a defendant‘s statements to an FBI
informant were not hearsay because the defendant made them to conceal a conspiracy to
commit money laundering and were a necessary part of furthering that conspiracy).
77
See infra Part II.B (discussing the policies behind statutes of limitations, giving special
attention to the federal statutes of limitations for non-capital offenses and tax crimes).
78
See infra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing the policy behind statutes of limitations in general,
the federal general statute of limitations that acts as a fallback provision for non-capital
offenses, the statute of limitations applicable to some tax offenses, and the relationship
between the statutes in the context of a money laundering prosecution).
79
See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining the policy and intent legislatures may have in enacting
a statute of limitations, the common characteristics of statutes, and how courts interpret
them).
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federal general statute of limitations for non-capital offenses, which
applies to money laundering crimes, and the statute of limitations that
applies to tax offenses.80
1.

Policy and General Characteristics of Statutes of Limitations

Legislatures may impose a time limit for a general or specific cause
of action to encourage, among other things, diligent action by litigants to
bring a cause of action.81 The Supreme Court views statutes of
limitations as statutes of repose ―established to cut off rights, justifiable
or not, that might otherwise be asserted and they must be strictly
adhered to by the judiciary.‖82 These are policy-based instruments that
balance the interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and society. 83 They also
represent the intentions of legislatures related to causes of action. 84
See infra Part II.B.2 (introducing the federal general statute of limitations, the statute of
limitations applicable to federal tax offenses, the characteristics of these statutes, and
interpretations of these statutes by federal courts).
81
See Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal “Fallback” Statute of Limitations: Limitations by
Default, 72 NEB. L. REV. 454, 457–58 (1993) (stating that legislatures have enacted statutes of
limitations applicable to ―common groups or categories of actions‖ and ones that act as
fallback or catch-all provisions applicable to any cause of action that lacks a limitation
period of its own). These statutes deny a plaintiff or a prosecutor the right to litigate a
cause of action if he fails to commence the action before the amount of time provided by
the statute passes. Id. at 457. For a discussion of additional policy goals underlying
statutes of limitations, see infra notes 82–94 (explaining the most prevalent policy goals
guiding statutes of limitations).
82
Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947). The Court admitted that when a statute
of limitation period expires and renders the court unable to litigate the claim, it may result
in inequities between the parties. Id. at 539. The Court restricted the judiciary‘s role in
providing remedies when the limitation period expires, stating that only the legislature can
provide such remedies and affirming the legislature‘s interest in enacting statutes of
limitations. Id.
83
Nelson, supra note 81, at 462. Plaintiffs share society‘s interest in having a claim
litigated. Id. at 462–63. Nelson explains the hypothetical process used by a legislature to
enact a statute of limitations as follows:
To choose an appropriate limitations period, the legislature must
evaluate the nature of the underlying cause of action, its policies, and
society‘s interests in having the right asserted. Then the legislature
must select a reasonable time in which the plaintiff can discover,
investigate, and assert his or her claim. The legislature must also
estimate how long the evidence and witnesses will be available and
reliable. The time period chosen is the period after which the need for
repose and avoiding stale claims outweighs the interests in enforcing
the claim.
Id. at 463–64 (foonotes omitted); see also Alan L. Adlestein, Conflict of the Statute of
Limitations with Lesser Offenses at Trial, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 199, 250–52 (1995) (stating
that statutes of limitations, particularly criminal ones, are strictly a matter of legislative
choice at the federal and state level). Furthermore, criminal statutes of limitations are
curious inventions in American jurisprudence, lacking foundation in English common law.
80
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The Supreme Court has held that courts should not question the
legislative intent in enacting a statute of limitations. 85 The role of courts,
rather, is to determine what limitation period governs. 86 A court must
also evaluate the conditions that require it to toll a statute of limitations
and not bar an action against a defendant. 87 Courts approach statutes of
Id. at 253–55. Criminal statutes of limitations became popular as the judiciary became more
responsive to the policy motivations behind civil statutes of limitations. Id. at 259.
84
Nelson, supra note 81, at 463 (―Time-bars also reflect the legislature‘s evaluation of the
underlying cause of action and the policies implicated. A short period may reflect
disapproval of the underlying right, a desire to protect the defendant, or the need for
prompt dispute resolution.‖). Other common law jurisdictions also view statutes of
limitations as legislative tools to advance the legislature‘s policy interests as well as
executive tools to allow prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., DEP‘T OF FIN. CAN., ENHANCING
CANADA‘S ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING REGIME § 6.15
(2005), available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/toc/2005/enhancing_-eng.asp (advocating for the
extension of the country‘s non-compliance limitation period in Canada‘s money laundering
statute in order to provide prosecutors greater flexibility in choosing whether to prosecute).
But see Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution,
102 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 632 (1954) (claiming that the policies behind statutes of limitations
are superfluous and represent no particular legislative motivation to provide a limitation
period). Elaborating on a possible countervailing result of statutes of limitations favoring
defendants, the author states:
[T]here is the possibility that the statutes may to a certain extent
encourage criminal activity by diminishing the certainty of
punishment. There may be a particular danger that where a first
offender‘s prosecution is barred by a statute, he may be encouraged to
return to criminal activity. With the habitual criminal upon whom
prior legal sanctions have apparently had little effect, perhaps the
criminal law is best served by his removal from society; to the extent
that this is true, and assuming that there is no doubt of guilt, the
statute of limitations is not desirable. Obviously, the statute also
prevents realization of the state‘s desire for retribution.
Id. at 634. The author then suggests giving prosecutors discretion whether to continue
prosecution as an alternative to the limitations period. Id.
85
Kavanagh, 332 U.S. at 539 (giving deference to the legislature and withholding judicial
speculation as to why the legislature wanted a specific limitation period for a cause of
action).
86
E.g., id. at 538–39 (rejecting the government‘s argument that a four-year statute of
limitations applied to a claim of tax controversy where the commencement occurred three
and a half years prior to the indictment because the specific cause of action warranted a
two-year limitation period under a different statute and thus barred the action).
87
See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49–50 (2002) (acknowledging that limitation
periods are subject to equitable tolling and states that the Court will presume Congress
drafts limitation periods with equitable tolling in mind, particularly in applying rules and
principles of equity jurisprudence). Exceptions to this rule apply when the statute does not
expressly provide for an exception or counters Congress‘s intent. Id. at 49; see also Diaz v.
Antilles Conversion & Exp., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 463, 467 (D.P.R. 1999) (stating that federal
law governs equitable tolling if a federal statute sets the limitation period). Furthermore, a
litigant must assert an opponent‘s misdeeds in order to request that a court toll the
limitation period despite the statute. E.g., Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,
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limitations with policies that seek to balance the interests between
plaintiffs and defendants, compel plaintiffs to take action, protect
defendants from stale claims, protect defendants from surprising
evidence, fraud, or both, and promote efficiency in courts. 88 A related
policy may force courts to use analogous limitation periods if a statute
does not provide one for a specific cause of action. 89 Likewise, where
467–68 (D.N.J. 1999) (rejecting plaintiff‘s assertion that defendant misled her on
information because her claims were vague). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3282, a properly submitted
indictment tolls the limitation period. United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 601 (2d Cir.
1976). Tolling a limitation period means that the period stops running. BLACK‘S LAW
DICTIONARY 1625 (9th ed. 2009). In simpler terms, tolling suspends the statute of
limitations where prosecutors or plaintiffs are unable to commence an action through no
fault of their own. JAMES E. CLAPP, WEBSTER‘S DICTIONARY OF THE LAW 431 (2000).
88
See Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487–88 (1980) (stating in dicta that statute
of limitations have long been respected as fundamental to the judicial system, which
recognizes the interests of plaintiffs not to have defendants keep him from litigating his
claim, but also recognizes the interest of defendants not to have a plaintiff litigate a claim
after so much time that it impairs the fact-finding process or upsets expectations);
DeMichele v. Greenburgh Cen. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 167 F.3d 784, 788 (2d Cir. 1999) (―[Statutes
of limitation] reflect legislative judgments concerning the relative values of repose on the
one hand, and vindication of both public and private legal rights on the other.‖). For an
example of how limitations compel the plaintiff to take action, see Norgart v. Upjohn Co.,
981 P.2d 79, 87 (Cal. 1999), which states that the intent of statutes of limitations is to force
plaintiffs to bring fresh claims against defendants. For examples of how limitation periods
protect defendants, see Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1973), which states
that statutes of limitations are ―designed to promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared‖; Cook v. City of Chicago, 192
F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1999), which recognizes the policy of protecting defendants from
stale evidence that is behind statutes of limitations; and Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d
281, 288 n.9 (4th Cir. 1999), which states that a statute of limitations puts a defendant on
notice of claims against him within the specified period. For examples of how limitation
periods promote judicial efficiency, see English v. Bousamra, 9 F. Supp. 2d 803, 807 (W.D.
Mich. 1998), which stated that limitation periods ―promote judicial efficiency by preventing
defendants and courts from having to litigate stale claims‖; and Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951,
960 (Ariz. 1998), which explained that statutes of limitations are intended to prevent
plaintiffs from making stale claims against both the defendant‘s and the court‘s interests.
But see Pearson v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1962) (noting that while the
policy behind statutes of limitations is to prevent litigation of stale claims, the substantive
character of the limitation period in relation to the claim may lean in favor of the defendant
when two statutes of limitations procedurally conflict).
89
Boyne v. Town of Glastonbury, 955 A.2d 645, 652 (Conn. 2008) (rejecting plaintiff‘s
argument that the statute lacking a limitation period did not bar his claim because public
policy requires courts to offer certainty to both parties and thus would favor applying a
limitation period in a cause of action). The most applicable statute rule is derived from the
Supreme Court‘s opinion in DelCostello v. Int‟l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 162 (1983). In
DelCostello, the Court addressed the issue of whether federal courts should apply state
limitation periods for enforcement of federal law. Id. at 161–62. The Court answered this
in the negative, preferring instead an approach of borrowing federal time bars when
applicable: ―[W]e have declined to borrow state statutes but have instead used timeliness
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causes of action may include multiple statutes of limitations, courts
might look at the substance of the action to determine which statute of
limitations controls.90
Similarly, state courts resort to statutory construction principles
based on the common law, favoring statutes of limitations that proffer
the longest limitation period or establish the most specific cause of
action.91 Federal courts discuss whether to apply the most suitable
rules drawn from federal law—either express limitations periods from related federal
statutes, or such alternatives as laches.‖ Id. at 162. The Court explained that state statutes
of limitations are mechanical and do not accommodate principles of equity inherent in
federal causes of action. Id.
90
See, e.g., Vrban v. Deere & Co., 129 F.3d 1008, 1009–10 (8th Cir. 1997). Vrban, heard in
the Eighth Circuit, interpreted Iowa state statutes of limitations. Id. at 1009. The plaintiff in
Vrban sued the defendant company for wrongful termination after requesting
compensation for work-related injuries. Id. The defendant claimed that the state‘s twoyear statute of limitations on tort claims applied because the termination was the basis for
either a tort claim or one concerning wages, which also has a two-year limitation period.
Id. The plaintiff argued that the underlying claim was one that did not provide a two-year
statute of limitations but would instead trigger a five-year limitation period. Id. The
Eighth Circuit applied the Iowa Supreme Court‘s rule that determining the statute of
limitations for a specific cause of action requires looking at the actual nature of the action.
Id. Referencing Iowa Supreme Court holdings on what constitutes a tort action, the court
then held that the five-year statute of limitations applied, reasoning that wrongful
termination of employment did not constitute a tort. Id. at 1010.
91
See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. Grant, 8 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1298 (N.D. Okla. 1998)
(holding that when two statutes of limitations may apply in any given case, the court will
look at the statute containing the longer limitation period); Gustafson v. Bridger Coal Co.,
834 F. Supp. 352, 357 (D. Wyo. 1993) (stating that under Wyoming law, absence of
legislative intent as to whether a statute of limitations applies to an unspecified tort action
allows courts to prefer longer limitation periods); McDowell v. Alaska, 957 P.2d 965, 971
(Alaska 1998) (favoring the longer of two limitation periods because courts disfavor the use
of the statute as a defense); Malone v. Malone, 991 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Ark. 1999) (stating that
policy dictates using the longer limitation period where the issue is unclear); Amco Ins. Co.
v. Rockwell, 940 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Colo. App. 1997) (favoring the longer limitation period
when two statutes of limitations apply because such statutes ―are in derogation of a
presumptively valid claim‖); Global Fin. Servs. v. Duttenhefner, 575 N.W.2d 667, 671 (N.D.
1998) (favoring the longer limitation period when there is a reasonable dispute between
two applicable statutes of limitations). The rule favoring the longest limitation period may
only apply if the favored limitation period is reasonable. Guertin v. Dixon, 864 P.2d 1072,
1077 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). For examples of courts applying the most specific cause of
action rule, see Grulke v. Erickson, 920 P.2d 845, 849 (Colo. App. 1995), which explained that
the statute of limitations that is the most specific, most recently enacted, and offers the
longest limitation period should apply in favor of another applicable statute; Watseka First
Nat‟l Bank v. Horney, 686 N.E.2d 1175, 1178 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997), which stated that the statute
of limitations that most specifically relates to the cause of action must be applied; Boyd v. C
& H Transp., 902 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Ky. 1995), which stated that ―[a] specific statute of
limitation preempts a general statute of limitation where there is a conflict‖; Reinke Mfg. Co.
v. Hayes, 590 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Neb. 1999), which favored a statute of limitations providing
a specific cause of action over a more general statute of limitations out of respect for the
legislature‘s intention that a special limitation period apply to a particular subject; and

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss1/9

Marusarz: Never Hanging Defendants Out to Dry: Preserving the Policy Behin

2010]

Never Hanging Defendants Out to Dry

277

statute rule or state statute of limitations depending on the cause of
action, but they also question the application of federal limitation
periods to state causes of action where there is Congressional silence and
lack of caselaw.92 While states create substantive rights that underlie
statutes of limitations, the federal statutes of limitations adopt the
common law approach that the statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense the defendant may waive without a timely assertion. 93
Regardless of whether they are substantive rights or affirmative
defenses, statutes of limitations balance the following interests: (1) the
protection of defendants from claims that are too old to litigate, (2) the
opportunity for prosecutors and plaintiffs to bring claims, and (3) the
preservation of judicial resources.94
2.

The General Federal Statute of Limitations and the Tax Crimes
Statute Under § 6531

The federal criminal statute of limitations for non-capital offenses
(―general statute of limitations‖ or ―§ 3282‖) establishes a five-year
limitation period except when another statute expressly imposes a
Under the general statute of limitations, an
limitation period.95
indictment must be made within five years of the commission of the
Thomas Steel, Inc. v. Wilson Bennett, Inc., 711 N.E.2d 1029, 1035 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998), which
affirmed that when a court must select a statute of limitations to apply to a statutory cause
of action, ―a special statutory provision which relates to the specific subject matter involved
in the legislation is controlling over a general statutory provision which might otherwise be
applicable.‖
92
See, e.g., Wallace v. Hardee‘s of Oxford, 874 F. Supp. 374, 376 (M.D. Ala. 1995)
(applying DelCostello in lieu of defendant‘s argument that because the cause of action
lacked a statute of limitations, the court should borrow the most applicable limitation
period from federal law). The court in Wallace, in an action against the defendant for
violating the Veterans‘ Reemployment Rights Act, found that legislative silence on the
statute made it unclear as to whether federal limitation periods should apply. Id. at 376.
The court found, however, that a congressional report and the lack of federal case law on
the matter went against applying a statute of limitations. Id. at 376–77. Thus, the court
decided to not apply a federal limitation period because the statute did not authorize it. Id.
at 377.
93
Nelson, supra note 81, at 459–60. If a defendant waived the defense, however, he may
still raise it in an amended answer if it is equitable to do so. Id. at 460. Raising it in this
way, the affirmative defense would still be subject to summary judgment, as well as a
motion to dismiss. Id.
94
See supra notes 81–93 (stating how the federal courts have recognized the three policy
interests underlying using statutes of limitations and giving a list of state and federal cases
where imposing limitation periods influences litigants in ways that favor these policies).
95
See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2006) (―Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no
person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the
indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense
shall have been committed.‖).
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offense.96 The circuit courts have found that should the prosecution
accomplish this, neither the due process rights nor the speedy trial right
of the defendant is violated.97 By contrast, § 3282‘s counterpart statute of
limitations for capital offenses, § 3281, offers no limitation period.98
One of the main goals behind the general statute of limitations is to
protect the defendant from a prosecution, which, obscured over time,
would be difficult to defend.99 The second reason is to grant the
prosecution enough time to collect information necessary for an
indictment.100 It does not give the prosecution, however, a license to
delay an indictment against the defendant.101 Federal courts have

Id. Bringing an indictment tolls the statute when it is considered found according to
the statute. E.g., United States v. Srulowitz, 819 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that an
indictment is found when brought before a grand jury and filed, which tolls the limitation
period).
97
See United States v. Radmall, 591 F.2d 548, 550 (10th Cir. 1978) (finding no due process
violation where the prosecution only delayed indicting the defendant to ensure a more
certain case against him and was not done to gain a tactical advantage which would
prejudice the defendant); United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 882 (5th Cir. 1972)
(rejecting defendants‘ argument that the prosecution‘s delay in bringing the indictment
violated due process because the prosecution brought the indictment within the limitation
period and was not found to be prejudicial); United States v. Hephner, 410 F.2d 930, 932–33
(7th Cir. 1969) (holding that prosecutorial delay in bringing an indictment did not violate
defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial because the indictment was timely
and the defendant did not make a request for a speedy trial).
98
See 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (2006) (―An indictment for any offense punishable by death may
be found at any time without limitation.‖).
99
See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114–15 (1970), in which the Supreme Court
stated that:
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal
prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence
of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal
sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from
having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may
have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the
danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past.
Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law
enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal
activity.
Id.
100
See United States v. Gibson, 490 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2007) (―The statute of
limitations and its tolling provisions are designed to allow the government time to
investigate crimes while protecting individuals from defending against charges for distant
offenses.‖).
101
See United States v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1966)) (―Absent a statute of limitations, an indefinite
suspension of prosecution impairs a defendant‘s constitutional rights and prolongs the
defendant‘s ‗anxiety and concern‘ over the pending charges.‖).
96
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construed statutes of limitations in favor of the defendant. 102 Similarly,
courts also interpret limitations statutes in favor of repose and place a
time limit on prosecutors to initiate an action. 103
In federal law, the general statute of limitations acts as a fallback
provision limiting application where a crime falls within a more specific
statute of limitations in the United States Code. 104 Thus, the general
statute of limitations acts as a fallback or catch-all provision with respect
to all conspiracy charges under § 371.105 It is not uncommon for federal
See e.g., United States v. Satz, 109 F. Supp. 94, 96 (N.D.N.Y. 1952) (stating that statutes
of limitations are ―matters of grace‖ and ―are to be liberally construed in favor of the
defendant‖).
103
E.g., United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932) In Scharton, the Court held that
a provision of the Revenue Act expanding the limitation period for attempts to defraud the
United States by tax evasion did not apply in favor of the defendant. Id. The Court
interpreted the language of the statute narrowly, stating that the exception specified the
crime of fraud, which the government failed to prove because it did not show the
defendant‘s intent to commit fraud. Id. at 521. The Court also rejected the government‘s
theory that fraud is an inherent element of tax evasion, stating that fraud is an element in
other offenses in the Internal Revenue Code. Id. Thus, the Court held in favor of the
statute‘s three-year limitation period, stating that ―as the section has to do with statutory
crimes, it is to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose, and ought not to be extended by
construction to embrace so-called frauds not so denominated by the statutes creating
offenses.‖ Id. at 522; see also United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 227 (1968)
(acknowledging the rule interpreting statutes in favor of repose following Scharton, but
rejecting defendant‘s theory that the six-year limitation period for tax evasion commences
on the date taxes are due based on Congressional intent relative to the statute of
limitations).
104
See 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2006) (stating that no limitation period applies to an offense of
sexual abuse, physical abuse, or kidnapping of a child unless the child is no longer living,
at which point the limitation period is ten years after the offense); id. § 3285 (applying oneyear limitation period in proceeding for criminal contempt against any person, corporation,
or association); id. § 3286 (instituting an eight-year limitation period for terrorism offenses
defined by statute and removing limitation period for terrorism offenses resulting in or
creating a foreseeable risk of death or serious bodily injury of another); id. § 3291
(expanding the limitation period to ten years for circumventing or conspiring to
circumvent federal nationality, citizenship, and passport laws); § 3295 (imposing a ten-year
limitation period on non-capital arson offenses); 26 U.S.C. § 6531 (2006) (applying a threeyear limitation period for tax-related offenses which is expanded to six years when
exceptions apply). The Supreme Court has held, however, that this does not apply to
regulations that do not impose perpetual duties. E.g., Toussie, 397 U.S. at 120 (holding a
regulation empowered by the Draft Act did not imply Congress‘s intent to make failing to
register for a military draft a continuing offense that keeps the limitation period running).
Congress eventually superseded Toussie. United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287, 1296 (8th
Cir. 1984) (stating that Toussie no longer applies after Congress amended the Draft Act
imposing a five-year limitation period to run after the defendant reached the age of twentysix).
105
See United States v. Grace, 434 F. Supp. 2d 879, 884 n.5 (D. Mont. 2006) (―Because the
conspiracy statute does not contain its own statute of limitations, the offense carries the
five-year statute of limitations generally applicable to non-capital federal criminal
offenses.‖); see also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (lacking a limitation period for conspiracy charges).
102
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courts to borrow this limitation period where there are no other
applicable statutes of limitations available in a cause of action. 106 For
example, 26 U.S.C. § 6531 sets a three-year limitation period for tax
offenses unless an offense falls within one of eight exceptions, which
extends the limitation period to six years. 107
Nelson, supra note 81, at 486–87 (stating that borrowing the most suitable federal
statute of limitations, while not the norm, has happened when it is more analogous than
available state statutes and ―when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of
litigation make the rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial
lawmaking‖).
107
26 U.S.C. § 6531. The section provides in part:
No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any of the
various offenses arising under the internal revenue laws unless the
indictment is found or the information instituted within 3 years next
after the commission of the offense, except that the period of limitation
shall be 6 years—
(1) for offenses involving the defrauding or attempting to
defraud the United States or any agency thereof, whether by
conspiracy or not, and in any manner;
(2) for the offense of willfully attempting in any manner to
evade or defeat any tax or the payment thereof;
(3) for the offense of willfully aiding or assisting in, or
procuring, counseling, or advising, the preparation or
presentation under, or in connection with any manner arising
under, the internal revenue laws, of a false or fraudulent return,
affidavit, claim, or document (whether or not such falsity or fraud
is with the knowledge or consent of the person authorized or
required to present such return, affidavit, claim, or document);
....
(5) for offenses described in sections 7206(1) and 7207 (relating
to false statements and fraudulent documents);
....
(8) for offenses arising under section 371 of Title 18 of the
United States Code, where the object of the conspiracy is to
attempt in any manner to evade or defeat any tax or the payment
thereof.
Id.; see also United States v. Ely, 140 F.3d 1089, 1090 (5th Cir. 1998) (favoring the general
statute of limitations over § 6531 in an indictment for conspiracy when the indictment did
not include a specific tax violation). The defendant in Ely claimed that § 6531 applied
because the underlying offense fell within the statute. Ely, 140 F.3d at 1090. The court
rejected this claim, reasoning that one of the elements of that offense did not apply to him.
Id. Thus, the indictment was subject to a § 3282 limitation period because it was only for
conspiracy to commit that offense. Id; cf. United States v. Lowry, 409 F. Supp. 2d 732, 740–
41 (W.D. Va. 2006) (stating that the broad purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act requires the
general statute of limitations, which did not toll prosecution for attempting to prevent the
IRS from collecting taxes by not reporting financial instruments owned in foreign
countries). The court in Ely agreed with the Fourth Circuit‘s decision in Lowder that
―[l]imitations, for indictments under § 371, are those supplied by other provisions of law,
or where there are none, by . . . § 3282.‖ Ely, 140 F.3d at 1090 (quoting United States v.
Lowder, 492 F.2d 953, 956 (4th Cir. 1974)). The underlying offense in Lowder was tax
106
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Under § 3282, commencement of the limitation period begins at the
completion of the offense, the substance of which Congress defines by
statute, and an indictment must appear within five years after
commencement.108 The Supreme Court has held that legislative intent
should guide the courts in determining when the statute of limitations
begins to run.109 The lower federal courts, however, are split in
evasion, which fell within an exception in § 6531 that extended the limitation period to six
years. Lowder, 492 F.2d at 955; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2006) (stating that a person
commits tax evasion by willfully making false statements on a tax return, statement, or
other document). The defendant argued that the underlying offense was conspiracy, which
would be subject to § 3282 instead of § 6531. Lowder, 492 F.2d at 955. The court disagreed,
preferring to adhere to a strict reading of both statutes of limitations and held that § 6531
applied when the indictment accuses defendant of conspiring to commit tax evasion. Id. at
956. The discrepancy between these two cases appears to have originated from a footnote
in Grunewald stating that § 3282 governed in that case. See Grunewald v. United States, 353
U.S. 391, 396 n.8 (1957) (stating that § 3282 will apply unless otherwise provided by
statute). The court in Lowder reasoned that the Grunewald footnote was not a part of the
holding, and that the applicable tax code statute of limitations was overlooked by the
Court. Lowder, 492 F.2d at 956. The government, however, can defeat a limitations defense
under § 6531 by filing the indictment for tax evasion within the limitation period. Gomez
& Schomig, supra note 69, at 1032–33.
108
18 U.S.C. § 3282. Section 3282 excludes the day of the offense for purposes of
commencement. United States. v. Guerro, 694 F.2d 898, 903 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying the
general rule that commencement for a conspiracy indictment begins the day after the
defendants committed the offense); United States v. Joseph, 765 F. Supp. 326, 327–29 (E.D.
La. 1991) (holding that an indictment filed on the anniversary of an offense was timely
because the policy of the statute of limitations is in favor of defendants and caselaw to the
contrary is irrelevant); cf. Burnet v. Willingham Loan & Trust Co., 282 U.S. 437, 439 (1931)
(holding that the then statute of limitations for tax assessments excluded the day of the tax
offense because of the statute‘s plain meaning that an assessment must be within five years
after a return was made). But see United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 2005)
(noting in the restatement of the facts that an indictment for child abuse, which began on
February 7, 1988, would be barred if made after February 7, 1993, under the general statute
of limitations); United States v. Dunn, 961 F.2d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that for mail
fraud convictions under § 3282, commencement begins on the date of mailings).
109
United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 227 (1968). In Habig, the defendants appealed
their conviction for filing false tax returns, claiming that the six-year statute of limitations
for tax crimes barred prosecution. Id. at 222. The Court addressed the issue of whether the
indictment, filed on August 12, 1966, was timely when the defendants filed their tax returns
on August 12 and 15, 1960. Id. at 223. The defendants argued that the limitation period
commenced on May 15, 1960, the date when the returns were due to be filed, which would
have made the indictment untimely. Id. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the
provision in the statute of limitations commenced the limitation period on the initial return
due date only when the filing was made prior to that date. Id. at 225; see 26 U.S.C. § 6513(a)
(stating that the limitation period commencing on ―the last day prescribed for filing the
return or paying the tax . . . without regard to any extension of time granted the taxpayer
and without regard to any election to pay the tax in installments‖ applies in the context of
early returns or advance payment of taxes). The Court reasoned that Congress did not
intend § 6513(a) to apply to § 6531 except when the tax returns were filed early. Habig, 390
U.S. at 225. Thus, the Court held that the limitation period commenced at the last act in
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determining the exact moment when the limitation period commences
for purposes of the tax evasion statute; some courts place
commencement from the last day the tax return was due, while other
courts mark it from the defendant‘s last affirmative act.110 Additional
evasive acts further complicate the question of commencement, as they
keep the limitation period running.111 In the context of conspiracy to
defraud the United States, the general rule is that the limitation period
commences at the time of the last overt act during the existence of the
conspiracy.112 This rendered dormant the rule, crafted by a scant
furtherance of the defendants‘ tax evasion scheme, within the six-year limitation period. Id.
at 227.
110
See United States v. Payne, 978 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that the statute
of limitations runs on tax evasion when the defendant fails to file taxes on or before the due
date); United States v. Kafes, 214 F.2d 887, 890 (3d Cir. 1954) (agreeing with the prosecution
that the due date for filing taxes completes the crime of tax evasion); United States v.
Sherman, 426 F. Supp. 85, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (calculating when the limitation period begins
based on the last date that the taxes were due). For examples of courts supporting the rule
that the limitation period commences upon the defendant‘s last affirmative act, see United
States v. Anderson, 319 F.3d 1218, 1219 (10th Cir. 2003), which distinguished Payne on the
ground that the defendant was committing a series of tax evasions; United States v. Ferris,
807 F.2d 269, 271 (1st Cir. 1986), which ruled that when the defendant attempted to evade
payment of the 1977 income tax through acts done in 1979 and 1983, the limitations period
commenced from the date in 1983 that the last act of evasion occurred, rather than the date
that the 1977 taxes were due; United States v. Trownsell, 367 F.2d 815, 816 (7th Cir. 1966),
which identified the defendant‘s liquidation of his assets and his deposit of the value
received in an overseas bank account, which occurred prior to the due date for that year‘s
tax payments, as the last affirmative acts of tax evasion; and United States v. Crocker, 753 F.
Supp. 1209, 1214 (D. Del. 1991), which stated that the limitation period for evading
payment of 1984 income tax commenced on the date it was due. When defendants are
alleged to have made false statements, the limitation period commences from the date the
statement was made. See United States v. Mousley, 194 F. Supp. 119, 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961)
(finding that offers to compromise with the government on back taxes owed gave false
information, and thus constituted affirmative acts of tax evasion that marked the beginning
of the limitation period). The district court for the District of Columbia supported a third
rule: the statute of limitations does not bar a prosecution at any point after a defendant
attempts to evade tax payment or fails to file taxes at some time during the original
running of the six-year limitation period, implying a series of tax evasions. United States v.
Shorter, 608 F. Supp. 871, 874–75 (D.D.C. 1985).
111
See Anderson, 319 F.3d at 1220 (maintaining adherence to the rule that the last
affirmative act commences the limitation period); see also United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3,
13 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 397 (2009) (stating that an act of tax evasion
commenced the limitation period and furthered a conspiracy to commit money
laundering).
112
Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946). For examples of what constitutes
overt acts, see Jeffries, 405 F.3d at 683, which identified statutory sexual or physical abuse of
a minor as overt acts; United States v. Eckhardt, 843 F.2d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1988), which
stated that a wire fraud scheme‘s last overt act was not the completion of the scheme, but
the charged call; and Fournier v. United States, 58 F.2d 3, 6 (7th Cir. 1932), which held that
mailing letters in furtherance of a mail fraud scheme was an overt act. Certain
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minority of courts, that a limitation period for a conspiracy indictment
commences at the first overt act.113 This focus on last overt acts in a
qualifications exist for the overt act requirement. See United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d
341, 355 (9th Cir. 1976) (alleging an overt act in the indictment is necessary); Eldredge v.
United States, 62 F.2d 449, 450–51 (10th Cir. 1932) (stating that a defendant must commit
the overt act to begin commencement); United States v. Mirabal Carrion, 140 F. Supp. 226,
227 (D.P.R. 1956) (averring that where there are several overt acts, prosecution must
sufficiently prove the last overt act to commence the limitation period); see also JanckoBaken, supra note 7, at 2175 (stating that the courts favor the last overt act rule because it is
the equitable remedy that best balances the interests of the litigants and the courts).
113
See Ex Parte Black, 147 F. 832, 841 (E.D. Wis. 1906) (determining that the conspiracy
statute required the limitation period to commence after the completion of the first overt
act); United States v. Owen, 32 F. 534, 536 (D. Or. 1887) (ruling that the limitation period
runs from the first overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy). The court in Owen presided
over a conspiracy defined in the applicable statute as an agreement to defraud or commit
an offense of revenue against the United States and an act of fraud or offense against the
United States. Owen, 32 F. at 536. The applicable conspiracy statute read as follows:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against
the United States or to defraud the United States in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy all the parties to such conspiracy shall be liable
to a penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars, or to imprisonment
for not more than two years or to both fine and imprisonment in the
discretion of the court.
Law of May 17, 1879, ch. 5440, 21 Stat. 4 (1879); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (criminalizing a
conspiracy to defraud or commit an offense against the United States). The court stated
that the applicable statute of limitations for a conspiracy begins to run at ―the commission
or consummation of the crime.‖ Owen, 32 F. at 537. The court defined consummation of
the crime as ―the first act done by any of the conspirators in pursuance thereof.‖ Id. The
limitation period began, the court determined, after the defendants committed the
agreement and the conspiratorial act because the statute limited the scope of the conspiracy
to those two elements. Id. The court also limited its ruling to conspiracy statutes
pertaining to instantaneous crimes as distinguished from continuous crimes:
An instantaneous crime, such as arson or killing, is consummated
when the act is completed. A continuous crime, such as carrying
concealed weapons, endures after the period of consummation. In the
former case the statute of limitations begins to run with the
consummation, while in the latter it only begins with the cessation of
the criminal conduct or act. But even then it is a bar to a prosecution
for any act or part of the continuous crime which occurred three years
prior to such time.
Id. The Eastern District of Wisconsin also considered the first overt act rule under the
contemporaneous conspiracy statute, elaborating on the distinction between instantaneous
and continuing crimes. Black, 147 F. at 841. The court in Black followed the District of
Oregon in Owen by hesitating to accept the idea that conspiracy was a continuing crime. Id.
The court admitted that its reluctance stemmed from the view that no act can be in
furtherance of a conspiracy after the defendants completely effectuate the conspiracy. Id. at
840. Adhering to this view, the court regarded any doctrine that considers an act done
after completion of a conspiracy as part of that conspiracy to be ―anomalous‖ because it
―might prolong a conspiracy, and . . . keep it in active operation until every obligation
incurred during the formative period of the plot had been liquidated.‖ Id. The court
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money laundering conspiracy shifts the focus to the results of
conspiracies instead of the objectives agreed upon by the conspirators,
which are not necessarily one and the same. 114
In summary, a problem with the money laundering statute appears
when a money laundering offense becomes theoretically unending
because it involves tax evasion and conspiracy within the laundering
scheme.115 Congress drafted the MLCA to give broad reach to
prosecutors when presented with the opportunity to indict defendants
who committed any of a broad range of activities connected to money
laundering schemes.116 Congress later amended the MLCA to allow
prosecution of tax evasion as a method of concealing illegally derived
funds.117 The MLCA, however, does not include provisions that allow

considered the prosecution‘s argument that a conspiracy is a continuing crime, but only to
the extent that the facts of a case make a conspiracy continuing. Id. at 841. The court
rejected this argument, however, stating that the prosecution can allege a new conspiracy if
the scheme continues by new overt acts within the period of limitation commencing upon
commission of that new conspiracy. Id.; see also 2 F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATT,
DEFENDING BUSINESS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMES § 23.22 (2d ed. 1984) (describing the first
overt act rule in Owen as a possible defense to a continually running statute of limitations
in white-collar conspiracies).
114
Cf., e.g., Doyle & Kenny, supra note 10, at 192 (noting that antitrust conspirators may
agree to restraining trade, but not to receive benefits from restraining trade after their
objectives are accomplished). Compare Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 403 (1957)
(finding that an act of concealing records was not intended to further the scheme of tax
evasion), with Upton, 559 F.3d at 13 (finding that tax evasion furthered the conspirators‘
agreement to launder funds through property transactions because it allowed the
conspirators to benefit from their transactions).
115
See MADINGER, supra note 33, at 48. Following the established law that completing the
crime of money laundering commences the limitation period, Madinger states that ―[t]his
raises an interesting question: If ‗dirty‘ money never gets really ‗clean,‘ when does one
ever really stop laundering it?‖ Id. In answering this question, Madinger gives an
example:
The answer may be ―never.‖ In at least one case, an individual who
made money by smuggling marijuana in the 1970s was charged with
money laundering in financial transactions that occurred after 2001.
He knew the assets he was moving around were originally acquired
with drug money, and he was still acting to conceal them and their
source from the government. The result was that, long after he left the
drug business, he found himself looking at jail time for money
laundering—something that wasn‘t even illegal back when he was a
smuggler.
Id. at 48–49. Hence, Madinger states, ―investigators can reach back a very long way to
catch money launderers.‖ Id. at 49.
116
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the legislative intent behind the MLCA and case law
interpreting the MLCA).
117
See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the nature of tax evasion and stating that Congress
amended the MLCA to include within the scope of money laundering prosecutions the
frequent use of tax evasion by launderers to conceal proceeds).
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indictments for conspiracy with a money laundering scheme or
provisions that establish a limitation period for such an indictment,
which prompts prosecutors and courts to rely on fallback statutes to fill
in the gaps.118 This omission has raised the question of whether a money
laundering scheme will perpetually toll the statute of limitations. 119
III. ANALYSIS
Courts have given little critique to the MLCA, as only district courts
have addressed the constitutionality of the MLCA with regard to the
definition of proceeds and notice. 120 Much of the criticism about the
MLCA that does exist stems from its vagueness. 121 A statute of
limitations is absent, which requires prosecutors to apply § 3282.122 The
MLCA also lacks a provision outlining prosecutions for conspiracies
See Strafer, supra note 33, at 206 (noting that the MLCA does not contain its own
conspiracy provision and relies on § 371 for a conspiracy indictment). Congress might
have intended to leave out a conspiracy provision in the MLCA in order to allow money
laundering prosecutions for situations not covered by existing law. Id. The MLCA subjects
defendants to penalties for conspiring to commit a money laundering offense based on the
particular offense committed. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); see also id. § 371 (subjecting conspirators
to a defined penalty of five years, a fine, or both, for conspiring to defraud or commit an
offense against the United States). The language of the MLCA also does not include a
limitation period for money laundering schemes. Id. §§ 1956, 1957; see also id. § 3282
(operating as a fallback statute of limitations for other statutory non-capital offenses that
lack their own limitation periods).
119
See Upton, 559 F.3d at 13 (asserting that prosecution of a money laundering scheme is
successful upon a finding that failing to file taxes is in furtherance of a conspiracy and
resets the limitation period). Upton drew criticism because it rejected the principle that the
Supreme Court established in Grunewald that acts of concealment did not necessarily
continue the original offense. John A. Townsend, Scoping the Conspiracy, 123 TAX NOTES
1047, 1048–49 (2009), available at http://www.tjtaxlaw.com/123TN1047.pdf (echoing the
Supreme Court‘s rejection of the prosecution‘s argument in Grunewald that a defendant
―concealing the substantive crime after its commission was within the implied scope of the
conspiracy to commit the substantive crime and that the overt acts of concealment thus set
the statute of limitations for prosecution‖).
120
Kacarab, supra note 23, at 41–42; see also United States v. Kimball, 711 F. Supp. 1031,
1034–35 (D. Nev. 1989) (stating that the provision in 18 U.S.C. § 1956 imposing criminal
penalties on avoiding a transaction reporting requirement is not vague because ―[t]here is
nothing in the legislative history [demonstrating] that Congress intended that the word
‗avoid‘‖ mean anything other than its common definition); United States v. Mainieri, 691 F.
Supp. 1394, 1397 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that proceeds are clearly defined by the context of
the statute, and that individuals who engage in financial transactions meant to conceal
illegally obtained money are put on notice by the statute‘s unambiguous wording).
121
Strafer, supra note 33, at 206. Congress enacted § 1956 ―hastily,‖ resulting in many
crimes being outside its scope. Id. Despite the sophistication of many money laundering
schemes, prosecutors must rely on other statutes as fallback statutes where the MLCA does
not provide a provision specific to prosecuting money laundering crimes. Id.
122
18 U.S.C. § 3282 (stating that the limitation period for a non-capital offense is five
years unless provided by another statute).
118
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formed during a money laundering scheme, which gives prosecutors
opportunity to use § 371 and that section‘s definition of the elements of
conspiracy.123 The absence of these types of provisions in the MLCA has
significant implications because it gives prosecutors power to indict a
broad range of acts both inside and outside the scope of the original
conspiratorial agreement.124 The abrogation of the strict standard set by
the Supreme Court in Grunewald, requiring direct evidence that a postconspiracy act be an overt act in furtherance of the original agreement
between conspirators, amplified the risk of over-prosecution when
applied to the complexity of money laundering schemes.125
This Part addresses the need for clarity in the MLCA that would
favor balanced application of a limitation period. 126 First, this Part
illustrates the flaws in the MLCA through the Upton decision, focusing
on its implication that a fact alleged in an indictment can defeat a claim
that the statute of limitations barred the prosecution. 127 This Part then
elaborates on the Upton decision, as it is one of several decisions that
attempted to diverge from the strict standard for connecting overt acts
and conspiratorial agreements that the Supreme Court laid out in
Grunewald.128 Next, this Part analyzes how alleging tax evasion is
enough to defeat a limitation period under a loose Grunewald standard.129

Id. § 371 (defining a crime of conspiracy as two or more persons intending to defraud
or commit an offense against the United States).
124
See SHAMS, supra note 3, at 56–57 (stating that open-ended definitions of the offenses in
money laundering statutes create a discrepancy that results in an aggressive enforcement
policy and noting implementation in cases that depart from the sorts of crimes for which
the statutes were originally intended).
125
See United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 13 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 397
(2009) (placing the Grunewald direct evidence standard under the scrutiny of the jury and
considering tax evasion to be an act of concealment if a reasonable jury would find as
such); Townsend, supra note 119, at 1048–49 (criticizing the Upton decision as diverting
from the Grunewald standard and addressing the practical implications of determining any
subsequent failure to file taxes to be an act of concealment in furtherance of a conspiracy).
126
See infra Part III (analyzing how the interaction between § 1956, § 371, and § 3282 do
not adequately protect a defendant‘s interest in having the prosecution bring an indictment
for money laundering within a certain amount of time).
127
See infra Part III.A (discussing the Upton decision as an indicator that the MLCA is
vague when applied, as it lacks provisions imposing a limitation period for conspiracy
charges, thus requiring application of the general limitation period established in § 371 and
§ 3282).
128
See infra Part III.B (explaining how the First Circuit and other lower courts have
interpreted Grunewald loosely by virtue of prosecutors bringing indictments for money
laundering under § 371, resulting in the risk to defendants of continual exposure to
indictments).
129
See infra Part III.C (addressing how including tax evasion as an element of
concealment in money laundering indictments complicates the relationship between the
MLCA and the statutes for conspiracy and limitations because tax evasion has its own
123
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Finally, this Part discusses alternative methods for applying limitation
periods, such as statutory rules favoring limitation periods under certain
circumstances and judicial rules regarding overt acts. 130
A. The Vagueness of the MLCA Risks Overbroad Application of Conspiracy
and Limitations Statutes
The First Circuit‘s decision in Upton demonstrates the problem of
applying a fallback statute of limitations to a money laundering crime. 131
First, the nature of a money laundering conspiracy is unending,
according to the logic of the Upton decision.132 This logic contrasts with
statute of limitations and proving tax evasion can have a chilling effect on defendants who
may have sought to minimize tax obligations by legal means).
130
See infra Part III.D (analyzing state rules favoring either more specific or longer
limitation periods and judicial consideration of acts in furtherance of a conspiracy as
alternative methods of applying statutes of limitations in money laundering indictments).
131
See United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 14 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 397
(2009) (holding that a post-crime act of concealment constituted an act in furtherance of a
conspiracy, thus precluding the defendant‘s raising of the statute of limitations as an
affirmative defense). The dissenting opinion in Upton criticized the majority‘s opinion for
diverging from the Supreme Court‘s direct evidence of an express original agreement
standard in Grunewald. Id. at 17 (Lipez, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that MLCA‘s
concealment element does not automatically turn subsequent acts of concealment involving
financial transactions into conduct within the money laundering conspiracy. Id. at 19. The
dissent advocated a literal interpretation of Grunewald that finds concealment furthers a
conspiracy only when the prosecution shows direct evidence of an express agreement to
conceal at the beginning of the conspiracy. Id. The dissent also rejected the majority‘s
reasoning that an act of concealment facilitating the central aim of the conspiracy furthers
that conspiracy. Id. at 20. The dissent criticized the court‘s depiction of the money
laundering scheme as a § 371 conspiracy, rather than a § 1956(h) conspiracy. Id. at 22–23.
Section 1956(h), the conspiracy provision exclusive to the MLCA, lacks an overt act
requirement, and any act alleged to have furthered the conspiracy would not have been
considered central to the conspiracy‘s aim under the Grunewald standard. Id. at 23–24; see
also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2006) (establishing penalties for conspiracy to commit money
laundering without requiring an overt act to indict). Thus, the dissent would have ruled
the money laundering conviction in Upton to be time-barred. Upton, 559 F.3d. at 24.
132
See Upton, 559 F.3d at 24 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the court‘s ruling that
the defendant‘s act of tax evasion ten years removed from the end of a money laundering
scheme concealed that scheme). The dissent stated that Grunewald supported the
proposition that viewing concealment efforts as part of a conspiracy by itself ―would ‗wipe
out the statute of limitations in conspiracy cases‘ and ‗result in a great widening of the
scope of conspiracy prosecutions‘ because ‗every conspiracy will inevitably be followed by
actions taken to cover the conspirators‘ traces.‘‖ Id. at 17 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (quoting
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 402 (1957); see also Townsend, supra note 119, at
1049 (criticizing the Upton decision as allowing a conspiracy to have an indefinite end
―depending on the unforeseeable individual acts of conspirators who are no longer
conspiring‖). As a result of Upton, prosecutors may allege any subsequent failure to timely
report proceeds from a specified unlawful activity under the MLCA to be either
concealment in furtherance of a money laundering conspiracy, or a presumption of a
defendant‘s involvement in a money laundering scheme. Id. Despite the Internal Revenue
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Grunewald, which stood for the proposition that a money laundering
scheme does end at some fixed point in time. 133 Second, the money
laundering statute is at risk of being overbroad, as its specified unlawful
activity provision defines countless acts of concealment that may further
a money laundering scheme.134 In the context of the statute of
limitations, any act listed in § 1956(c)(7) can defeat a bar to prosecution
because a prosecutor can claim that a defendant committed an act listed
in § 1956(c)(7) and allege that the limitation period commenced when the
defendant committed that act.135 As a result, a defendant will have a

Code‘s requirement to report profits of criminal enterprises without risk of prosecution by
the government, it is uncommon for money launderers to report and pay taxes on their
proceeds, which is in effect tax evasion. Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006) (making it a
crime to evade paying taxes by failing to file or falsifying returns). What results from this
situation is the ―never-ending conspiracy,‖ as the limitation period will commence upon
the last overt act, i.e., the failure to file the most recent tax return. Townsend, supra note
119, at 1049.
133
See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 401–02 (―[A]llowing such a conspiracy to conceal to be
inferred or implied from mere overt acts of concealment would result in a great widening
of the scope of conspiracy prosecutions, since it would extend the life of a conspiracy
indefinitely.‖). Of particular concern to the Court in Grunewald was that a finding that acts
of concealment preclude a time-bar to a prosecution ―would for all practical purposes wipe
out the statute of limitations in conspiracy cases‖ because conspiracies by their nature
include an element of concealment. Id. at 402.
134
See SHAMS, supra note 3, at 56–57 (raising concerns about overly broad money
laundering statutes such as the MLCA). Three significant discrepancies exist in the policy
of the money laundering statutes in § 1956 and § 1957: (1) the definitions of the offenses
are open-ended; (2) the source of the funds were the only restriction on a finding of actus
reus; and (3) the purpose of the actions are all-encompassing. Id. These discrepancies
made it ―safe to say that over-breadth of the definitions has resulted in an incoherent
enforcement policy,‖ specifically that aggressive enforcement has resulted in cases where
the statute‘s implementation departs from situations originally intended. Id. at 57.
Overbroad application of the money laundering statutes, according to Shams, illustrates
that:
These issues are serious in the context of criminal law enforcement in
that they undermine fundamental legal principles. For example, the
principle of legality mandates that there is no crime without a law. A
broad legal definition that fails to put those concerned on sufficient
notice would fail to satisfy the mandates of the principle of legality.
Further, this extensive prosecutorial discretion would undermine the
principle of equality before the law: equal cases will be treated
unequally.
Id.
135
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (providing an exhaustive list of specified unlawful activities
qualifying under the activity element, including racketeering, criminal enterprise, and
enumerated offenses under Title 18).
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difficult time raising an expired limitation period as an affirmative
defense to a money laundering prosecution. 136
The tax evasion provision in § 1956 creates a problem in that an act
of tax evasion, even if it is slightly related to a money laundering
scheme, may constitute an overt act in furtherance of that scheme. 137 As
the ruling in Upton indicated, tax evasion can constitute an act in
furtherance of a conspiracy.138 Moreover, there is a concern that courts
may rule that prosecutors do not need to distinguish between tax
aversion, which is not a crime, and tax evasion. 139 As a result, it will
become more difficult to maintain the Grunewald direct evidence
standard if courts allow prosecutors to show no more than a reasonable
belief that a defendant‘s failure to file taxes was an act in furtherance of
the original agreement.140 The next Section discusses this expansion of
the scope of conspiracy.141
B. Loosening of the Grunewald Direct Evidence Standard Makes the Scope of
the Conspiracy in Money Laundering Crimes Overbroad
Grunewald stood for the proposition that courts should not interpret
acts of concealment following a conspiracy to be within the scope of the
See MADINGER, supra note 33, at 48 (stating that the crime of money laundering is
never really completed because proceeds from unlawful activity never lose their illegal
nature, implying that money laundering is an unending crime).
137
See § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) (stating that a defendant‘s conduct intending ―to engage in
conduct constituting a violation of section 7201 or 7206‖ constitutes money laundering).
138
United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 14 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 397 (2009).
139
See United States v. Kimball, 711 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (D. Nev. 1989) (rejecting the
argument that the definition of the word ―avoid‖ in the context of the transaction reporting
requirement was synonymous with the definition of ―evade‖ as in § 7201 and § 7206). The
Kimball court‘s conclusion that aversion and evasion are synonymous has come under
criticism on the grounds that those words have different meanings in the tax code. See
Strafer, supra note 33, at 193 (stating the court in Kimball erred in noting the distinction).
Strafer elaborates:
In tax parlance, the terms avoid and evade do have different meanings.
It is not a crime to avoid paying taxes. Avoidance only becomes illegal
evasion when a taxpayer uses means which are themselves prohibited
by law. Either the taxpayer files false tax returns concealing the very
existence of income or he utilizes deductions or tax reporting methods
which are prohibited by the Internal Revenue Code. However, where
the Code or the legality of the taxpayer‘s reporting method is itself
unclear, he cannot properly be convicted of tax evasion.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
140
See Townsend, supra note 119, at 1049 (echoing the concern of the dissent in Upton that
the Grunewald standard would not permit ―conflating a mere subsequent act of
concealment into the original agreement simply because it occurred‖).
141
See infra Part III.B (asserting that case law modifying the Grunewald standard has
expanded the scope of conspiracies to a potential limitlessness).
136
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original agreement without evidence of a direct connection between the
acts and the original agreement.142 Grunewald also stood for the
proposition that courts should bar an indictment for the conspiracy
unless there was a direct connection between subsequent acts of
concealment and the original agreement.143 Upton, however, complicated
the Supreme Court‘s decision in Grunewald.144 This complication is not
entirely a recent development, as the direct evidence standard in
Grunewald has come under criticism for too greatly limiting the
prosecutor‘s capacity to prove an original agreement. 145 The District
Court for the Northern District of California, for example, modified the
Grunewald standard on the ground that Grunewald did not do enough.146
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit avoids Grunewald and instead imposes a
lesser burden on prosecutors to prove evidence connecting acts of
concealment within the original agreement.147
Aronoff, supra note 61, at 560 (stating that the Court established the direct evidence
standard in Grunewald to prevent courts from inferring that subsequent acts of concealment
were within the scope of the original agreement without a showing of a direct connection).
143
See id. at 562 (stating that the government must prove conspirators agreed to an act of
concealment in the original, express agreement before the government can use evidence of
that act to prove the continuation of a conspiracy). Failure to prove a direct connection
excludes the act of concealment as alleged in the indictment. Id. at 553.
144
See supra notes 131–32 (elaborating on the argument put forth by the dissent in Upton
that the court misapplied the Grunewald standard).
145
See Aronoff, supra note 61, at 558 (―Critics of Grunewald have suggested that requiring
direct evidence of an express conspiratorial agreement to conceal would effectively prevent
prosecutors from using an ‗express original agreement to conceal‘ approach.‖). One court
concluded that any attempt to prevent discovery of an already committed crime does not
constitute an act in furtherance of a conspiracy. Green v. U.S. Prob. Office, 504 F. Supp.
1003, 1005-06 (N.D. Cal. 1980), rev‟d, 671 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1981).
146
Green, 504 F. Supp. at 1005–06 (dismissing parts of an indictment claiming the
defendant hid information from federal agents in furtherance of a conspiracy because the
act of concealment occurred after the original crime started to be revealed). The ruling of
Green thus suggests that the Court‘s approach in Grunewald did not go far enough in
limiting what constitutes concealment in furtherance of a conspiracy. Aronoff, supra note
61, at 558 n.87. Thus, the Green decision extends beyond what the dissent in Upton would
have decided. Compare United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 21 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 397 (2009) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (―By confining ‗necessary‘ acts of concealment to
those that occur contemporaneously with the overt acts that comprise the substantive
crime, the Supreme Court‘s concern in Grunewald—that acts of concealment not be used to
indefinitely extend the duration of a conspiracy—does not arise.‖), with Green, 504 F. Supp.
at 1005 (―[L]ater attempts to cover up a crime as it begins to come to light cannot be taken
to be overt acts that make up the original conspiracy.‖).
147
United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127, 141 (7th Cir. 1966) (stating that acts following
the completion of a conspiracy that indicate a conspiratorial design can further a
conspiracy). Criticism of the Seventh Circuit‘s reasoning in Hickey revolved around the fact
that the court ignored the direct evidence language in Grunewald. Aronoff, supra note 61, at
560. Instead, the court only required that there should be ―evidence that the conspirators
originally agreed to take certain steps after the principal objective of the conspiracy was
142
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Criticism of these rulings raises the concern that courts are
attempting to diminish the effect of the Grunewald standard.148 Such
courts attempted to weaken the Grunewald standard by not requiring
prosecutors to show direct evidence that conspirators agreed in the
original agreement to commit an act of concealment.149 The courts in
these cases reasoned that it is appropriate to allow a jury to infer an
original agreement when a crime, by its nature, has ―no specific
terminating event‖ and ―provides a substantial inference of agreement to
conceal or cover-up.‖150 These cases, however, limit the effectiveness of
the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, while simultaneously
reached, or evidence from which such an agreement may reasonably be inferred.‖ Hickey,
360 F.2d at 141. This has been interpreted as a loosening of the Grunewald standard, for
―the ‗ample evidence‘ used by the court to justify its decision was not the ‗direct evidence‘
required by Grunewald.‖ Aronoff, supra note 61, at 560.
148
Id. at 564. Aronoff remarks on the effect of recent rulings on the Grunewald standard,
stating that:
Grunewald was the culmination of the Supreme Court‘s effort to
balance the dangers of a continuing conspiracy against the dangers of
improperly using acts of concealment to allege and prove such a
conspiracy. . . . The deterioration of the direct evidence requirement in
Hickey and the circumvention of that requirement in Nowak and
Bonanno exemplify a failure properly to identify acts of concealment
and result in a failure to maintain the Grunewald balance. A
continuation of this trend will pave the way for the ―ominous
expansion of the accepted law of conspiracy‖ that Krulewitch . . . and
Grunewald sought to prohibit.
Id. at 564–65 (footnote omitted).
149
See United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 1980) (following Grunewald in
stating that ―a subsidiary conspiracy to conceal may not be implied from circumstantial
evidence showing merely that the conspiracy was kept a secret and that the conspirators
took care to cover up their crime in order to escape detection and punishment‖); United
States v. Franzese, 392 F.2d 954, 964 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that evidence of the defendants‘
agreement to furnish bail and counsel for one another prior to committing a string of bank
robberies demonstrated direct evidence of concealment by giving a defendant the incentive
not to name names and established the defendants‘ intent to continue the conspiracy). The
court in Davis held that a defendant‘s declarations about plans to burn down a warehouse
containing a corporation‘s inventory were an act of concealment in furtherance of a
conspiracy to declare bankruptcy and defraud creditors. Davis, 623 F.2d at 192.
150
United States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376, 383–84 (7th Cir. 1978). Compare id. (involving a
conspiracy to evade taxes), with Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 441 (1949)
(involving a conspiracy to violate the White Slave Traffic Act). The court in Mackey stated
that the basis for distinguishing the Court‘s ruling in Krulewitch was that the crime in
Krulewitch was a ―discrete criminal act‖ which did not by its nature require substantial
efforts to conceal. Mackey, 571 F.2d at 383. In contrast, the issue before the court in Mackey
was tax evasion, a crime that by its nature demanded substantial efforts at concealment. Id.
In a footnote, the court further elaborated by stating that achieving the goal of a conspiracy
terminates it. Id. at 383–84 n.10. The court implied that there is no single event that
completes a conspiracy of tax evasion; therefore, a defendant must always work to conceal
the act. Id.
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circumventing the Grunewald standard by easing the burden on
prosecutors to demonstrate that an act was in furtherance of a
conspiracy.151
As an inchoate crime, conspiracy creates a problem of ongoing
criminal acts which courts have addressed through rulings that defeat
the criminal limitation period under § 3282.152 Courts have tried to
resolve this problem and, in doing so, created another danger:
overriding the statute of limitations without the necessary requisite of
direct evidence to prove that acts of concealment are overt acts
furthering the main objectives of conspiracy.153 Neither § 371 nor § 3282
provides guidance on how to prevent the danger to defendants of
ongoing exposure to charges and endless opportunities for prosecutors
to prosecute money laundering crimes. 154 An appropriate resolution
See Upton, 559 F.3d at 14 (concluding that a post-conspiracy act does not need to meet
the direct evidence standard in order for a reasonable jury to determine it was an act of
concealment); Mackey, 571 F.2d at 383 (diverging from the Grunewald standard and stating
that a conspirator‘s statement is sufficient evidence of a continuing conspiracy because a
jury ―could infer that an agreement to conceal existed at the outset of the conspiracy‖);
United States v. Nowak, 448 F.2d 134, 139–40 (7th Cir. 1971) (stating that giving false
statements in order to misapply money from a government savings and loan was not part
of an original agreement to conceal but constituted concealment because it violated a
federal anti-concealment statute); United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 112–13
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), rev‟d sub nom. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960)
(distinguishing Grunewald on the grounds that the defendants violated a federal statute
criminalizing acts the defendants used to conceal a conspiracy).
152
See Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. at 112 (discussing the main dangers arising in a conspiracy
and its effect on the statute of limitations). The court states:
The statute of limitations in a criminal case serves not only to bar
prosecutions on aged and untrustworthy evidence, but it also serves to
cut off prosecution for crimes a reasonable time after completion, when
no further danger to society is contemplated from the criminal activity.
A continuing conspiracy is a continuing danger. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the statute of limitations runs from the last objective act
that indicates that the original agreement, and the danger arising
therefrom, is still alive. . . . [W]hen the end or ends of a conspiracy
have not been attained, the conspiracy should be considered alive so
long as the danger of fruition lives. In such cases it is not that the
statute of limitations has been extended but that the ends of the
conspirators were pitched far in advance by their original agreement.
Id. at 112–13.
153
Aronoff, supra note 61, at 564–65. The danger that the weakening of the Grunewald
standard poses will abrogate the precedent the Supreme Court laid out in cases like
Krulewitch and Grunewald. Id. at 565; see also Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 454–55 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (expressing concern that the majority‘s opinion holding co-conspirator
statements inadmissible as evidence of concealment ―introduced an ominous expansion of
the accepted law of conspiracy‖).
154
See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (stating only that conspiracy to defraud or commit an
offense against the United States is a crime without including any definitions of the
151
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must emphasize the distinction between acts done pursuant to a
conspiratorial agreement and receipt of benefits as a result of such
acts.155 This solution must also recognize that not all money laundering
schemes function as enterprises because conspirators may agree to form
a scheme without agreeing to any consequence of the scheme long after
they meet their objectives.156 This problem becomes more apparent
when tax evasion is alleged as an act of concealment, which the next
Section analyzes.157
C. Alleging Tax Evasion as an Act of Concealment in a Money Laundering
Indictment Creates Tension Between the MLCA and Applied Statutes
Although tax evasion is one example of an act of concealment that
can be used to further a money laundering scheme, Upton illustrates how
the tax evasion provision of § 1956, coupled with a liberal interpretation
of the Grunewald direct evidence standard, can circumvent a limitation
period.158 This complication first arises when defendants attempt to
disguise an act of tax evasion as tax minimization, which makes it
difficult to determine whether the defendant was concealing proceeds in
furtherance of a conspiracy or reducing his tax liability.159 Courts must
determine whether a reduction of tax liability was evasion or
minimization because the latter cannot be direct evidence of an express

elements of conspiracy); id. § 3282 (providing that non-capital offenses are subject to a fiveyear limitation period without any provisions prescribing when such periods commence
and applying generally as a fallback provision absent other applicable statutes of
limitations for certain crimes).
155
Cf. Doyle & Kenny, supra note 10, at 192–94 (stating that antitrust conspiracies serve a
purpose to restrain trade and not just for unjust enrichment of the conspirators).
156
Cf. Jancko-Baken, supra note 7, at 2189–90 (arguing that because RICO prosecutions
lack an overt act requirement, determining when an individual conspirator abandoned the
conspiracy is the appropriate approach for commencing a limitations period in RICO
prosecutions).
157
See infra Part III.C (discussing the significance that alleging tax evasion as an act of
concealment has on the tension between the MLCA and § 3282).
158
See United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 10–15 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 397
(2009) (evaluating the defendant‘s claim that the indictment did not defeat the statute of
limitations and rejecting his argument that an act of tax evasion was not an act of
concealment in furtherance of a money laundering conspiracy); see also supra note 76
(introducing the facts of the Upton case and the First Circuit‘s reasoning behind its
decision).
159
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, supra note 58, at 65. Even in the context of
international money laundering prevention, the personal mentality of reducing one‘s own
tax liability when possible cannot go unnoticed. Id. This complicates the distinction
between tax evasion, an illegal practice, and tax minimization, a legal practice, as
intentional reduction of tax liability approaches tax evasion. Id.
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original agreement to conceal proceeds of a money laundering scheme. 160
Courts also consider the defendant‘s motivation or intent to evade taxes
as significant in determining the existence of an affirmative act; indeed,
several courts prefer to let juries make inferences about evidence of an
affirmative act of evasion instead of expecting absolute evidence of an
affirmative act.161
Although Upton is a case of first impression within the First Circuit,
its ruling is similar to the rulings of other circuits that have concluded
that conspiracies involving acts of tax evasion present an endless danger
because the opportunity to bar a prosecution may never arise.162 It is
possible, however, to distinguish these cases based on whether the
relationship between tax evasion and the goal of the conspiracy is
significant.163 Alternatively, if these cases should be thought of as related
because of the presence of tax evasion, regardless of its purpose in a
conspiracy, then there is a question as to whether the § 6531 statute of
limitations should apply instead of the more general § 3282.164 Part III.D
discusses such alternative methods.165
D. Alternative Methods of Considering the Statute of Limitations Can
Accommodate the Complexity of Money Laundering Schemes
There are two ways of approaching the complexity of money
laundering schemes through state common law rules about limitation
periods.166 First, state rules can favor certain statutes of limitations,
See id. (stating that the line between legal tax minimization and illegal tax evasion is a
fine one).
161
See Gomez & Schomig, supra note 69, at 1038 (stating that some courts have rejected
the affirmative act requirement and have concluded instead that a jury may infer from the
evidence that a defendant committed such acts willfully).
162
See Upton, 559 F.3d at 13–14 (concluding that a reasonable jury could infer that the
defendant‘s false tax returns for two years were part of an ongoing plan to conceal a money
laundering scheme); United States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376, 384 (7th Cir. 1978) (concluding
that a reasonable jury could find that the defendants concealed information from an
investigation to further the main objective of a conspiracy to commit tax evasion).
163
Compare Upton, 559 F.3d at 6–7 (involving an act of tax evasion that defendants
allegedly intended to use to conceal proceeds in a complicated money laundering scheme),
with Mackey, 571 F.2d at 379–81 (involving an act of tax evasion that defendants allegedly
intended to serve as the main goal of the conspiracy).
164
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006) (establishing a five-year limitation period to apply to
non-capital offenses unless provided by another statute), with 26 U.S.C. § 6531 (2006)
(establishing a three-year limitation period for tax offenses, with an exception for tax
evasion that has a six-year limitation period).
165
See infra Part III.D (discussing the insight state rules and judicial approaches to the
overt acts in confronting complex money laundering schemes).
166
See infra Part III.D (discussing state rules favoring statutes of limitations that are more
specific or provide longer limitation periods and then discussing case law on the first and
160
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which raises the question of whether federal application of these rules
will serve to balance the policy of a limitation period to benefit a
defendant in an indictment for money laundering.167 In particular, this
section analyzes whether application of state rules favoring limitation
periods will allow the use of § 6531 as an affirmative defense.168 Second,
this section will discuss how courts apply the first and last overt act
rules, two theories that try to resolve the question of when the statute of
limitations should commence in a conspiracy.169 Section 3282, however,
does not have an overt act requirement, leaving courts to make the
difficult evaluation of what is an act in furtherance of a conspiracy.170
1.

State Rules Favoring Certain Statutes of Limitations

State statutory construction principles provide insight into the
question of which statute of limitations applies in a money laundering
indictment.171 Federal courts have yet to adopt either the rule favoring
the longer limitation period or the rule favoring the most specific cause
of action in cases under federal law.172 Application of the rule favoring
the longer limitation period may serve to give the prosecutor a longer
period of time in which to bring an indictment, assuming that the
allegations in the indictment are reasonable. 173 If, for example, a
last overt act rules, which determine both the scope of the conspiracy and the point at
which the limitation period commences).
167
See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing the rules state courts have used to determine the most
appropriate statute of limitations to apply to an indictment, depending on if the courts
favor the longer limitation period or the most specific statute of limitations for a cause of
action).
168
See infra notes 176–81 and accompanying text (analyzing whether the § 3282 limitation
period applies to tax evasion conspiracies when viewed under state law principles in
applying limitation periods).
169
See infra notes 182–87 and accompanying text (introducing the first and last overt act
rules as attempts by courts to resolve the issue of when limitation periods commence
without guidance from the controlling conspiracy statute).
170
See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006) (providing only that non-capital offenses are given a fiveyear limitation period, but not addressing what would constitute commencement).
171
See supra note 91 (listing state court rulings favoring statutes of limitations that either
provide the longest limitation period or correlate with the most specific cause of action).
172
See Wallace v. Hardee‘s of Oxford, 874 F. Supp. 374, 376 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (rejecting
defendant‘s argument that absence of an applicable limitation period in a cause of action
required the court to apply the most applicable federal statute of limitations because there
was no case law or authorization from Congress supporting the borrowing of a limitation
period).
173
Compare 26 U.S.C. § 6531 (2006) (applying a six-year limitation period when
applicable), with 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (applying a five-year limitation period as a fallback
provision). Some courts applied the longer limitation period rule on the grounds that a
litigant bringing a claim to court has a valid claim and should be allowed an opportunity to
litigate it. See McDowell v. Alaska, 957 P.2d 965, 971 (Alaska 1998) (stating that the court
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prosecutor alleges that a defendant committed tax evasion to conceal
proceeds, then application of § 6531 would extend the limitation period
to six years instead of the shorter five-year period under § 3282.174 This
extends the amount of time the prosecution has to bring an indictment,
but it also gives the prosecution an opportunity to decide whether to
pursue an indictment for conspiracy to commit money laundering
against the defendant.175
Similarly, the rule favoring the most specific cause of action gives
notice to the defendant of what limitation period applies when any one
act violates another statute.176 Although § 3282 is a fallback statute,
courts have ruled that in the case of a conspiracy involving tax evasion,
the limitation period is five years rather than six years as provided in
§ 6531 for tax evasion indictments. 177 This pattern suggests that in a
money laundering conspiracy where the defendants are alleged to have
committed tax evasion to conceal the proceeds of the scheme, § 3282
applies instead of § 6531 despite the former‘s exception provision. 178

will prefer a longer limitation period because use of a time-bar as a defense is discouraged);
Guertin v. Dixon, 864 P.2d 1072, 1077 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (limiting application of the
longer limitation period rule to indictments that have reasonable allegations); Amco Ins.
Co. v. Rockwell, 940 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Colo. App. 1997) (favoring the longer limitation
period because a claim is presumptively valid).
174
See 26 U.S.C. § 6531(1) (stating that a conspiracy to violate the internal revenue laws
commences a six-year limitation period); 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (stating that any non-capital
offense not provided for in another statute commences a five-year limitation period).
175
Cf. DEP‘T OF FIN. CAN., supra note 84, § 6.15 (advising an extension of the statute of
limitations for convicting non-compliance violations). Extending the Canadian statute of
limitations for purposes of the money laundering regime provides greater flexibility to
prosecutors in determining whether to prosecute. Id.
176
See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (providing a generally applicable limitation period for non-capital
offenses); 26 U.S.C. § 6531 (providing a limitation period for tax offenses only); see also
Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Hayes, 590 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Neb. 1999) (preferring a statute of
limitations for a specific statutory cause of action over a more general one because the more
specific limitation period reflects the legislature‘s express will in direct relation to the
specific cause of action); Thomas Steel, Inc. v. Wilson Bennett, Inc., 711 N.E.2d 1029, 1035
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (stating that the court will determine the proper limitation period
based on whether the defendant committed an act in violation of a statutory provision
relating to the subject matter of that cause of action).
177
See United States v. Ely, 140 F.3d 1089, 1090 (5th Cir. 1998) (dismissing defendant‘s
claim that an indictment against him for a tax violation was time-barred because § 3282
applies to a conspiracy indictment under § 371 unless another statute provides otherwise).
178
See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (providing that a five-year limitation period will apply unless a
limitation period is authorized by another statute); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S.
391, 396 n.8 (1957) (stating that § 3282 governed in an indictment for a conspiracy to evade
taxes to defraud the United States without stating its reason for applying § 3282 instead of
§ 6531); Ely, 140 F.3d at 1090 (holding that § 3282 applied in defendant‘s claim because the
prosecutors brought the indictment under § 371, and the tax offense was not applicable to
defendant because he did not satisfy an element of that offense).
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This is bolstered by the fact that courts have applied the § 3282 limitation
period in such instances.179 Furthermore, because courts are split on
whether § 6531 or § 3282 applies, the claim that the Supreme Court
settled the matter based on § 371‘s lack of a provision granting a
limitation period is questionable. 180 Proper application of these rules,
either by courts or as amendments to the MLCA, would therefore also
require evaluating § 371‘s relationship with the MLCA; namely, whether
the prosecutor properly defined the cause of action against the defendant
as either conspiracy or money laundering in the indictment. 181
2.

Judicial Approaches to the Overt Act Requirement

Alternatively, judicial approaches to the overt act requirement give
guidance on how to address the problem of concealment in the MLCA. 182
The dominant rule defining when the limitation period commences
states that commencement begins upon the last overt act, which the
Supreme Court in Grunewald limited to the main objective of the
conspiracy.183 There has been precedent in support of the principle that
the limitation period should commence upon the first overt act if the
See United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 397 (2009)
(stating that § 3282 applies for violations of the money laundering statute and that the
indictment was for conspiracy to commit money laundering).
180
See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 396 n.8 (stating that a conspiracy under § 371 requires
§ 3282 because the conspiracy statute does not have its own time-bar provision). Compare
Ely, 140 F.3d at 1090 (holding that defendants‘ conspiracy to disclose tax return information
in violation of federal statute invoked the general limitation period), with United States v.
Lowder, 492 F.2d 953, 956 (4th Cir. 1974) (ruling that defendant‘s conspiracy to commit tax
evasion in violation of § 7201 was not barred because Grunewald did not mandate that the
§ 3282 limitation period is required in conspiracy charges involving tax offenses).
181
See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to the MLCA that will reconcile the gaps in
the application of conspiracy, money laundering, and limitations statutes, which leave a
money laundering conspiracy unending, and that will tip the balance of the policy interests
related to statutes of limitations back to equalize the interests of defendants and
prosecutors).
182
See infra notes 183–87 and accompanying text (discussing judicial approaches toward
applying the overt act requirement to the issue of when a limitation period commences).
183
See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946) (stating that when the conspiracy
statute requires existence of an overt act, the last overt act commences the limitation
period); see also Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 401–02 (declining to extend the last overt act rule to
acts of concealment intended to cover up the conspirators‘ involvement because all
conspiracies have some act of concealment included, and to extend the rule would defeat
the purpose of the statute of limitations); Jancko-Baken, supra note 7, at 2175 (discussing the
last overt act rule and the implications it has on what the prosecution must prove to defeat
a defense of the statute of limitations). Courts have generally accepted the last overt act
rule because it balances the defendant‘s interest in the application of a uniform statute of
limitations and the prosecutor‘s interest in not needing to bring several charges of
conspiracy. Id.
179
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applicable statute defines the conspiracy as having two provisions: (1)
an agreement and (2) the act completing the conspiracy.184 The first
overt act rule received little support from the courts but stood for the
proposition that a conspiracy must end at some point in time. 185 Courts
have dismissed this rule as a matter of policy asserting that it too heavily
favors the defendant‘s interest in uniform application of the statute of
limitations at the expense of reducing administrative waste.186 Despite
the last overt act rule‘s popularity among courts, the Supreme Court in
Grunewald appeared to recognize the policy behind the first overt act rule
that the language of the federal conspiracy statute requires a conspiracy
to end at some point, regardless of its nature. 187
In summary, the First Circuit decision in Upton illustrates a
misapplication of the Grunewald direct evidence standard that otherwise
raises the burden of proof required to show that a post-conspiracy act of
concealment was in furtherance of the original conspiracy. 188 Upton also
illustrates the problems with relying on fallback provisions absent in the
MLCA.189 Congress recognized the complexity of money laundering
conspiracies by drafting the MLCA to include a wide variety of specified
unlawful activities and transactions that conceal the illegal nature of

See United States v. Owen, 32 F. 534, 538 (D. Or. 1887) (rejecting the prosecution‘s
argument that the limitation period commences upon the last overt act of a conspiracy
because the statute at issue did not define a conspiracy as having acts in furtherance of a
conspiracy).
185
See Ex parte Black, 147 F. 832, 841 (E.D. Wis. 1906) (stating that a new overt act after the
completion of a conspiracy begins a new conspiracy).
186
See Jancko-Baken, supra note 7, at 2175 (stating that courts prefer the last overt act rule
over the first overt act rule because the prosecution can avoid administrative waste by not
having to bring new indictments for conspiracy). Jancko-Baken adds that in conspiracy
statutes that lack an overt act requirement there is no method or formula for determining
when an overt act time-bars an indictment. Id. at 2176. When there is no overt act
requirement in the statute, courts should look for evidence of an agreement because the
agreement ―remain[s] the essence of a successful conspiracy charge where proof of an overt
act is not required.‖ Id.
187
See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (allowing an indictment for conspiracy if it alleges the
defendant did ―any act to effect the object of the conspiracy‖); see also Law of May 17, 1879,
ch. 5440, 21 Stat. 4 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006)) (making a defendant liable for
conspiracy if he committed any act to effect the object of the conspiracy); Grunewald, 353
U.S. at 404 (requiring direct evidence that shows conspirators agreed to conceal the
conspiracy after completing its main objectives). The Court refused to adopt ―the
proposition that the duration of a conspiracy can be indefinitely lengthened merely because
the conspiracy is kept a secret, and merely because the conspirators take steps to bury their
traces.‖ Id. at 405.
188
See supra Part III (comparing Upton and Grunewald).
189
See supra Part III.B (discussing Upton and other cases that have diverged from the
Grunewald direct evidence standard).
184
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funds derived from criminal activity, including tax evasion.190 The
MLCA, however, remains incomplete, and more specific provisions in
§ 1956 and § 1957 stating the conditions for a conspiracy indictment
could reconcile the complexity of money laundering schemes and the
interests in preserving effective statutes of limitations for such crimes. 191
IV. CONTRIBUTION
As shown above, judicial attempts to interpret the MLCA abrogated
the principle that a limitation period should be balanced in favor of the
defendant when enough time has passed to make evidence difficult to
obtain.192 A legislative solution modifying the MLCA and applicable
statutes can give certainty to defendants expecting possible indictments
for money laundering conspiracies.193 A legislative solution can also
maintain the Supreme Court‘s direct evidence standard from
Grunewald.194
This Part proposes amendments to the MLCA and applicable
statutes to effectuate the policies of limitation periods and reduce the
danger of stale money laundering claims being brought against
defendants.195 First, Part IV.A discusses a proposed limitations provision
for § 1956 that will apply the policy that statutes of limitations protect
defendants from stale claims to money laundering indictments. 196 Part
IV.B then proposes an amendment to § 1956 that codifies the Grunewald
direct evidence standard and settles confusion in the lower courts as to
the scope of the Grunewald standard.197 Finally, Part IV.C sets out a
See generally § 1956(c)(7) (listing several activities and crimes that Congress defined as
specified unlawful activities for purposes of establishing that element in a money
laundering prosecution).
191
See infra Part IV (proposing model amendments to the MLCA that provide a limitation
period for money laundering crimes in addition to conspiracy provisions, which relate to
money laundering).
192
See supra Part III (analyzing how courts and the MLCA permitted the time limit to
indict money laundering conspiracies to extend to a point where defendants are in
continual danger of prosecution long beyond the completion of the conspiracy).
193
See infra Part IV (proposing model amendments to the MLCA, including limitation
and conspiracy provisions specific to money laundering crimes within § 1956, as well as
amendments to § 371 and § 3282 that exclude their application in § 1956 indictments).
194
See supra Parts III.A–C (discussing how courts‘ interpretations of the Grunewald
standard abrogated the principle that a conspiracy must end to maintain the purpose of the
limitation period asserted by the Supreme Court); see also infra Part IV.B (proposing a
model amendment to § 1956 codifying the Grunewald standard).
195
See infra Part IV (proposing model amendments to the MLCA, § 371, and §3282).
196
See infra Part IV.A (amending § 1956 to include a limitations provision separate from
the general limitations provision under § 3282).
197
See infra Part IV.B (defining the direct evidence standard that the Supreme Court
established in Grunewald for purposes of § 1956); see also Grunewald v. United States, 353
190
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model conspiracy provision for purposes of § 1956 that prevents
prosecution of money laundering conspiracies under § 371 and therefore
precludes application of the general limitation period under § 3282.198
The amendments proposed below conserve the policy of a limitation
period as a legislative instrument, in addition to limiting the scope of
proving a conspiracy under Grunewald.199
A. Amending § 1956 with a Limitations Provision Recognizes Complex
Money Laundering Schemes
Section 3282 excludes non-capital offenses from the general
limitation period if a statute explicitly requires a specific limitation
period.200 As discussed above, prosecutors routinely use § 3282‘s general
limitation period when they bring indictments for money laundering. 201
Prosecutors also justify application of § 3282 by alleging that money
launderers committed conspiracy under § 371, the general conspiracy
statute.202
Thus, Congress should amend § 1956 to include a limitations
provision that the statute lacks.203 This provision will be labeled
subsection (j) and should state:

U.S. 391, 404 (1957) (stating that evidence must support a direct connection between an act
of concealment that occurred after the objectives of the conspiracy were met and the
original agreement to conceal funds in a money laundering scheme).
198
See infra Part IV.C (proposing an amendment to § 1956 that replaces conspiracy to
commit money laundering, which requires amending § 371, with an exclusionary clause
that prevents prosecutors from bringing indictments for money laundering under a
conspiracy claim).
199
See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 413–14 (providing a standard requiring juries to infer that
an act of concealment was part of the original agreement when there is direct evidence
suggesting that inference); supra Parts III.A–B (discussing the Supreme Court‘s decision in
Grunewald that attempted to limit the scope of alleging a conspiracy to launder money for
purposes of applying a limitation period, and cases succeeding Grunewald that diminished
the effect of the Supreme Court‘s interest in limiting the scope of conspiracy for purposes of
the statutes of limitations); see also supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (stating that
federal courts have shown deference to Congress‘s policies behind limitation periods).
200
18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006).
201
See supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text (discussing how the MLCA lacks a
conspiracy provision, thus prosecutors include § 371 when bringing an indictment for
money laundering conspiracies, resulting in application of § 3282 as a fallback limitation
period).
202
See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (stating that § 3282 is a fallback
limitation period for non-capital offenses that is also brought in under § 371).
203
See supra notes 120–25 (discussing the absence of a limitations provision in § 1956,
which results in money laundering crimes being indicted under § 371 and the
consequential danger of the unending conspiracy).
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(j) Limitation period—a prosecution for an offense under this
section must be brought within five (5) years from the date of
the last overt act committed in furtherance of a money
laundering offense. A prosecution for an offense under this
section, including an indictment for tax evasion under
sections 7201 and 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code, must be
brought under the limitation period provided in section 6531
paragraphs (5) and (8) of the Internal Revenue Code. 204
This provision will exclude money laundering offenses from the
general limitation period under § 3282 because it is a limitations
provision sensitive to money laundering indictments. 205 This will
prevent defendants from being subjected to the five-year limitation
period in § 3282 and will leave the option to apply the limitation period
in the model amendment to § 1956 or the six-year limitation period in
§ 6531.206 Section 6531‘s limitation period may be more appropriate in an
indictment alleging tax evasion by virtue of rules favoring the more
specific and longer limitation period.207
B. Amending § 1956 with a Definition of Direct Evidence That Maintains a
Consistent Interpretation of the Grunewald Standard
The Grunewald standard requires evidence that directly connects an
act of concealment after the conclusion of a money laundering
conspiracy and the original agreement to conceal.208 As discussed in Part
III, however, lower courts have inconsistently applied this standard.209
Amendments to § 1956 are necessary to avoid future inconsistent
The proposed amendment is italicized and is the contribution of the author.
See § 3282 (excluding statutes already containing limitation periods from the general
five-year period).
206
See id. § 3282 (providing a five-year limitation period for non-capital offenses under
federal law unless a specific statute establishes its own limitation period); 26 U.S.C. § 6531
(2006) (subjecting acts of tax evasion to a six-year limitation period); supra note 204
(proposing a standard limitation period for indictments brought under § 1956); supra notes
166–187 and accompanying text (analyzing rules determining when limitation periods
commence and judicial approaches to the overt act requirement).
207
See supra Part III.D.1 (analyzing state rules favoring application of the longer and
more specific limitation period as alternative methods for applying a limitation period to a
money laundering indictment).
208
See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 413–14 (1957) (stating that a jury can
only infer that an act of tax evasion was intended to cover up a crime unless evidence
allows an inference that tax evasion was part of an original agreement to conceal funds
derived from illegal activity).
209
See supra Part III.B (describing how some lower courts have either expanded or
limited the scope of the Grunewald standard with regard to post-conspiracy acts of
concealment and the original agreements to conceal).
204
205
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interpretations of this standard by lower courts. 210 Thus, Congress
should amend § 1956 with the following provision and label it paragraph
(1) of subsection (j):
(1) “Money laundering offense” for purposes of this section is
as defined in subsection (a) and subsection (c).211
This provision retains the existing definition of a money laundering
offense because it is not necessary to redefine money laundering for the
purpose of a limitation period.212 Another provision to subsection (j) will
codify the Grunewald direct evidence standard.213 Thus, paragraph (2) of
subsection (j) should read:
(2) “Last overt act” for purposes of this subsection is an act of
concealment of funds derived from specified unlawful
activities, as listed in subsection (c), provable by direct
evidence to have been a part of the original agreement.
“Original agreement” for purposes of this subsection is
an agreement between two or more persons to conspire to
conceal funds derived from specified unlawful activities
prior to beginning the conspiratorial acts. “Direct
evidence” for purposes of this subsection is evidence that
two or more persons agreed to conceal funds derived from
unlawful activities specified in subsection (c), and to
commit overt acts in furtherance of that agreement.214
The definition of direct evidence in this paragraph reflects the
Supreme Court‘s conclusion in Grunewald that a jury would not find
evidence of a connection between the original agreement and a postconspiratorial act of concealment if a conspirator did not intend for the

See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 415 (stating that based on the direct evidence standard, the
trial judge must instruct the jury that it may infer an act of concealment as furthering a
conspiracy if it finds that the central conspiratorial aim was to commit and conceal their
objectives, in order to protect conspirators from prosecution, and that the acts of
concealment proved at trial were a part of this aim); supra Part III.B (discussing how lower
courts diverged from the Supreme Court‘s strict standard by interpreting the direct
evidence standard differently).
211
The proposed amendment is italicized and is the contribution of the author.
212
See supra note 26 (providing the language of § 1956(a)(1), which defines money
laundering as an offense); see also supra note 29 (referring to § 1956(c), which defines the
terms Congress used in establishing the elements of money laundering).
213
See supra Parts III.A–B (analyzing the Supreme Court‘s decision in Grunewald, which
attempted to limit the scope of conspiracy prosecutions for money laundering crimes, and
the application of that standard by lower federal courts).
214
The proposed amendment is italicized and is the contribution of the author.
210
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alleged act of concealment to further the goals agreed to at the outset of
the conspiracy.215
This will prevent courts from inferring that
subsequent acts of concealment are within the original agreement of the
conspiracy to conceal funds and, thus, preclude circumvention of the
applicable statute of limitations in a money laundering prosecution.216
This amendment to § 1956 best confronts money laundering conspiracies
with respect to the Grunewald standard because it recognizes the
particular nature of money laundering schemes in comparison with
other continuing conspiracy crimes.217 A conspiracy provision within
§ 1956, however, is still needed to prevent the use of the general
conspiracy statute.218
C. Amending § 1956 with a Conspiracy Provision That Excludes Money
Laundering Prosecutions from § 371 Indictments and Precludes Applying
the General Limitation Period Under § 3282
As discussed in Part III, prosecutors rely on § 371 to bring an
indictment for a money laundering scheme.219 An amendment to § 371
excluding its application to an indictment under the MLCA will prevent
prosecutors from coupling an indictment with this statute, thus
preventing application of the § 3282 limitation period.220 An amendment
to the MLCA with its own conspiracy provision parallel to the § 371
amendment retains that statute‘s effect for purposes of a money
laundering indictment and also rejects the premise that a money
laundering scheme is a general conspiracy that is subject to the § 3282
limitation period.221
215
See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 411 (dismissing the Second Circuit‘s conclusion that the jury
could infer from the evidence that there was a direct connection between the original
agreement to conceal and an alleged act of concealment after the conspiracy‘s objectives
ended); supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text (analyzing courts‘ interpretations of the
overt act rules in applying a limitation period in a conspiracy indictment).
216
See supra Part III.B (addressing the lower courts‘ inconsistency in applying the
Grunewald standard).
217
See supra Part III.B (analyzing the Grunewald direct evidence standard and the limits it
imposed on alleging acts in furtherance of a conspiracy).
218
See infra Part IV.C (proposing an amendment to § 1956 making money laundering
conspiracy prosecutions exclusive to the MLCA and preventing application of § 371 in such
prosecutions).
219
See supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text (stating that prosecutions for money
laundering fall under § 371, thus the limitation period under § 3282 applies because the
MLCA lacks a limitations provision).
220
See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (discussing how prosecutors could
include § 371 in an indictment for money laundering conspiracies to allow application of
the fallback five-year limitation period under § 3282).
221
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2006) (providing that the penalty for conspiring to commit
money laundering is determined by the offense that substantiates the object of the
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Section 371 will read as follows:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit
any offense against the United States, or to defraud the
United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or
for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both. This Section will not apply to
prosecutions for conspiracy under sections 1956 and 1957
elsewhere in this title.222
An amendment to § 1956(h) is needed to preserve the opportunity to
prosecute for conspiracy but without the added risk of applying the
general statute of limitations:
Any person who conspires to commit any offense
defined in this section or section 1957 shall be subject to
the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the
commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.
Such an offense will be subject to the limitation period
provided in subsection (j).223
This amendment is parallel to the above amendment to § 371 and
precludes conspiracy indictments under that statute.224 This model
amendment to § 371 prevents money laundering indictments from being
subject to the general limitation period under § 3282.225 Instead, this
amendment subjects the indictments to the particular language of
§ 1956‘s model limitations provision.226 This will give effect to § 1956(h)
as a conspiracy provision for money laundering schemes, recognizing

conspiracy); supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (stating that § 1956 lacks a
conspiracy provision that includes a specific limitation period to a money laundering
indictment).
222
§ 371 (amendment proposed by author italicized).
223
Id. § 1956(h) (amendment proposed by author italicized).
224
See supra note 222 (providing an amendment to § 371 that excludes prosecutions for
money laundering conspiracies and does not subject money laundering schemes to the
general statute of limitations under § 3282).
225
See supra note 204 (providing a model amendment to § 1956 instituting a limitation
period particular to money laundering indictments).
226
See supra note 204 (specifying the language that § 1956 needs to provide prosecutors
with a limitation period for money laundering schemes).
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that such schemes do not always qualify as traditional conspiracies that
fall under the general conspiracy statute. 227
V. CONCLUSION
Since its passage in 1986, the MLCA has implemented Congress‘s
interest in preventing financial transactions that conceal funds derived
from illegal activities. The Act‘s 1988 amendment gave it even broader
powers to prosecute transactions that conceal funds through tax evasion.
The broad reach Congress gave to prosecutors to indict alleged money
laundering schemes raises issues stemming from reliance on other
criminal statutes for effect. Specifically, prosecutors rely in their
indictments on § 371, which criminalizes conspiracy against the United
States, and § 3282, which establishes a limitation period for non-capital
offenses, both of which generally apply and leave interpretation of their
general language to the courts. What results is the unresolved issue of
when limitation periods commence in a money laundering indictment
and the related question of when limitation periods expire. Given the
sometimes complex nature of money laundering schemes and the vague
language of the applicable statutes, the answer for purposes of the
MLCA may be ―never.‖
The legislative solution proposed in Part IV brings the MLCA closer
to the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Grunewald that evidence of an overt
act in furtherance of a conspiracy must make a direct connection
between the act of concealing funds derived from illegal activities and
the original agreement to conceal. As the First Circuit evinces in Upton,
courts have diverged from the Grunewald standard, which implied that a
conspiracy ends at some point in time, and instead, have suggested that
§ 371 allows the prosecution to circumvent the limitation period. The
proposed amendment to the MLCA will preserve the policy that
defendants should be protected from claims for acts that time makes too
difficult to prove. The amendments will also reaffirm the Supreme
Court‘s position in Grunewald that, unless the conspirators agreed to
continue the conspiracy indefinitely, a money laundering scheme must
have a definite end from which a limitation period can commence.
David Marusarz

See supra note 155 (noting how money laundering conspiracies, like antitrust
conspiracies, may not be traditional conspiracies when the conspirators‘ intent was not to
receive the benefits of their conspiracy but to achieve the objectives of the conspiracy).
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